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The Ungovernable Citizen: Psychopathy,
Sexuality, and the Rise of Medico-Legal
Reasoning
Susan R. Schmeiser*
There is likewise a form of mental derangement in which the intellectual faculties
appear to have sustained little or no injury, while the disorder is manifested
principally or alone, in the state of feelings, temper, or habits. In cases of this
nature, the moral and active principles of the mind are strangely perverted or
depraved; the power of self-government is lost or greatly impaired; and the
individual is found to be incapable, not of talking or reasoning on any subject
proposed to him ... but of conducting himself with decency and propriety in the
business of his life.
-J.C. Prichard'
It is necessary here to impress the fact that the true sexual pervert is not a master
of his will ....
-Alfred W. Herzog
2
I. GOVERNING THE UNGOVERNABLE
While law and the behavioral sciences operate on generally disparate,
and often incommensurable, assumptions about human character, they
have found occasions for collaboration nonetheless. One such occasion
arose in the middle decades of the twentieth century around the problem of
* Associate Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. I am grateful to the many friends
and colleagues who contributed valuable insights as this project evolved, including Paul Schiff
Berman, Anne Dailey, Bill Eskridge, Carolyn Grose, Melanie Khanna, Ellen Rooney and Vicki
Schultz. My argument benefited considerably from Kim Leighton's astute engagement. Teresa
Alutto, Emily Gallas, Sara Gogal, and Sarah Lisitano assisted ably with various portions of the
research. I also want to thank participants in the University of Connecticut School of Law Faculty
Workshop, the Cardozo School of Law School Junior Faculty Workshop, and the Hofstra Schol of
Law Symposium on Law and Sexuality, whose careful consideration of my project brought many
aspects of it into sharper relief. Members of the Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, particularly
Ceara Donnelly, provided excellent editorial guidance. Finally, generous research support from
American University's Washington College of Law and the University of Connecticut School of Law
made completion of this project possible. All mistakes, of course, are my own.
1. J.C. PRICHARD, TREATISE ON INSANITY 4 (1835).
2. ALFRED W. HERZOG, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 538 (1931).
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regulating antisocial behavior in subjects who did not meet conventional
criteria for insanity, and yet seemed undeterred by existing legal sanctions.
This Article undertakes a genealogical analysis that focuses on rhetoric
and reasoning to illuminate the evolving relationship between two
authoritative disciplines. It also offers an historical account that links the
rise of medico-legal reasoning to new forms of sexual regulation and the
emergence of sexual identities.
A. Disorders of self-government
"Psychopath": the word inspires dread, contempt, revulsion. It evokes
images of serial killers and cannibals, leering pedophiles and, in a recent
twist on the category, ruthless CEOs who cruelly and shamelessly plunder
their employees' pensions for their own selfish gain. From Norman Bates
to Hannibal Lector and Jeffrey Dahmer to Tom Ripley, the psychopath has
cut a riveting figure in the popular culture of the last century. His (for the
most recognizable incarnations have been largely male) particular power
to inspire terror and loathing derives in part from his ability to pass as
"normal." Cunning, seductive, and utterly devoid of remorse, he flouts
morality and flaunts his indifference to the bonds of sociality. As we have
seen in longstanding debates about the relationship of psychopathy to
criminal responsibility, the psychopath confounds traditional legal
categories of sanity and insanity. Without a conscience or superego, he
remains incapable of self-government, and yet with his manipulative
prowess he frequently eludes external regulation as well.
Such an ungovernable subject presents special challenges to a
democratic society organized around the rule of law, challenges that
require new mechanisms of control and containment. The ability to
govern the self plays a critical role both in conceptions of democracy and
in understandings of the individual citizen who makes democracy
possible. Just as the nation governs itself with mechanisms of
moderation-the checks and balances inhering in our separation of
powers-and rules of law that guard against tyranny, so too the good
citizen must exercise reason, industry, and self-restraint to remain worthy
of participation in and protection from the governing body.
This view of the self as capable of and responsible for acting upon these
principles continues to undergird American jurisprudence despite
challenges from a variety of disciplines. Most forceful, most tenacious,
and most heeded among these challenges has been the one issuing from
psychiatry, for psychiatry in all its diverse incarnations operates upon the
premise that the health of the human mind is fragile at best, and self-
government an immensely fraught enterprise. Over the course of the last
century, psychiatrists have persuaded us that hereditary, intrapsychic and
chemical forces dictate our actions and our personalities, frequently
[20:163
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eclipsing reason and self-control. As one psychiatrist wrote in the mid-
twentieth century: "Man is far from having the logical mind he is
supposed to have; he is more swayed by emotions and impulses than by
mature intellect and ripe judgment."3  Psychiatric insights--especially
those derived from psychoanalysis, but also those gleaned from
biomedicine and most recently neuroscience-thus have troubled ideals of
self-government and rationality.
In particular, psychoanalytic psychiatry in the first half of the twentieth
century diagnosed failures of self-government as a formidable challenge to
the rule of law, claiming a specialized knowledge essential to surmounting
this challenge. Doctors located such failures in the newly identified
personality known as the psychopath, whose pathologies exhibited
themselves above all in the realm of sexuality. Beginning at the turn of
the twentieth century, the burgeoning theory of psychoanalysis placed
psychosexual development at the core of the self and its social trajectory.
Psychiatrists linked sexuality and its disorders to crises of self-government
while advocating a new medical model of deviance to supplant existing
legal ones.
Psychiatric and legal professionals whose interests and assumptions
about human behavior remained divergent through the nineteenth century
saw these interests converge around the question of sexual deviance,
particularly that of homosexuality. Indeed, as I shall argue below,
homosexuality among all non-normative sexualities became a privileged
site for negotiating issues of responsibility and culpability, which took on
a new urgency with the psychiatric turn in medico-legal reasoning. As the
psychiatrist Wladimir Eliasburg wrote in his 1947 article "Irresistible
Impulse and Crime,"
[t]he controversy here has been whether a deed should be punished
severely because it is obviously in keeping with the character and
thus proves the moral turpitude of the perpetrator or whether just
because it is obviously a produce of the evildoer's nature and nothing
more, should be dismissed as free of guilt. Cases where such
controversies arise are those of sexual perversions, particularly of
homosexual misdemeanors and felonies.4
This fundamental dilemma, whether and how to punish or restrain
persons whose "nature" potentially compelled them to behavior at odds
with cultural norms, defined collaborative endeavors between members of
the legal and psychiatric communities.
The fraught partnership between law and psychiatry has had broad and
profound cultural implications too diverse to address thoroughly here. My
3. BENJAMIN KARPMAN, THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND His OFFENSES 218 (1954).
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purpose, in part, is to trace the beginnings of this relationship. In so doing,
I will argue that the collusion of these disciplines, marked by the rise of
medico-legal reasoning,5 permitted participants to negotiate the nature and
limits of the ideal legal subject of liberal democracy, and to attempt to
manage the psychical and social forces that threatened to undermine this
subject. Recently, the United States Supreme Court reflected upon this
partnership in reviewing a due process challenge to Arizona's test for
insanity. In Clark v. Arizona, the court upheld Arizona's narrow insanity
defense - one focusing solely on a defendant's inability to apprehend the
wrongfulness of his criminal act - as well as its exclusion of expert
testimony on the defendant's metal disorder as it bore on his capacity to
form the particular mens rea required for the offense at issue. Justice
Souter, writing for the majority, recognized a state's prerogative to adopt
its own formulation of the insanity defense, and indeed potentially to
adopt no formulation at all, by emphasizing the malleable and contested
nature of psychiatric knowledge. Moreover, he justified the exclusion of
mental disease testimony from the evidentiary consideration of a
defendant's mental state at the time of the crime as a logical response to
the dangers that "arise because of the imperfect fit between the questions
of ultimate concern to the law and the information contained in a clinical
diagnosis."6
Yet despite this "imperfect fit," psychiatric knowledge has evolved with
an eye toward questions of law and legal regulation, just as law has at
times made psychiatric insights central to its development. Thus law and
psychiatric medicine, as well as the behavioral sciences more generally,
have developed in a dialectical relationship, one in which what scholars
have called the "juridification" of medicine7 occurs alongside the
medicalization of law.8 In what follows, I examine a period in which legal
and psychiatric endeavors intersected in mutually constitutive ways
around the problem of certain subjects whose social deviance appeared to
elude traditional regulatory mechanisms. With the invention of
psychopathy as a category of mental disorder, particularly in its sexual
incarnations, psychiatry offered to law a figure demanding a new sort of
medico-legal regulation. The psychopath found its most salient
incarnation in the homosexual, whose deviance, whether express or
5. This collusion also exemplifies the emergence of the modem administrative state and its new
mechanisms of regulation. My analysis, however, proceeds largely within a discursive rather than an
institutional context.
6. Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2735 (2006).
7. Jose Brunner, Trauma in Court: Medico-legal Dialectics in the Late Nineteenth-Century
German Discourse on Nervous Injuries, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 697, 701 (2003).
8. Brunner makes a "historiographical argument that in the course of its interaction with
medicine, law does not remain law in its original form but becomes a kind of medicine, while, in one
way or another, medicine turns into a discipline using legal procedures and making legal
recommendations." [d. at 703.
[20:163
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incipient, required a shift in emphasis from antisocial acts to ungovernable
identities. Paradoxically, though, the psychopath proved deeply unstable
as an object of inquiry and regulation: too indistinct to locate or define
with certainty, it thwarted the authority of both psychiatry and law.
The remainder of Part I offers a 1946 case, People v. Barnett, to
illustrate the emergent form of legal reasoning that medicalized the
problem of self-discipline. To trace the evolution of this reasoning, Part II
briefly revisits tensions between psychiatry and law in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. Psychiatry has been implicated in legal
reasoning since its inception as a medical discipline, even as the two
disciplines have remained in contention with one another. Here I focus on
early psychiatric contributions to debates about free will and contours of
legal subjectivity. Since the psychopath soon would become a central
figure in these exchanges, I consider in Part III the concept of psychopathy
as it emerged in medico-legal discourse. My analysis emphasizes the
influence that psychiatric elaborations of psychopathy exercised over legal
culture, illuminating in particular the psychiatric construction of the
"criminal sexual psychopath." I turn in Part IV to the legal appropriation
of this category, its statutory codification and its incipient discontents
within both the medical and the legal communities. Cases and
commentaries addressing these developments suggest that the homosexual
emerged for a time as the paradigmatic psychopath. Finally, Part V
elaborates the medico-legal treatment of homosexuality in this period,
contending that the medical model of deviance organized a new
jurisprudence of identity. I conclude with a brief reflection on the
misgivings that arose around this fraught collaboration between law and
psychiatry.
B. People v. Barnett: departures from "normal mentality"
In 1946, the California Supreme Court reversed two lower court
decisions denying a special hearing to a defendant on trial for unnamed
sexual offenses with a variety of adolescent boys.9 Under the California
Welfare and Institutions Code, such a hearing was available to a defendant
who convinced the court through affidavit that he fell under the state's
definition of a "sexual psychopath," as specified in section 5500.0 This
section provided that, if a court received an affidavit alleging sexual
psychopathy on the part of any person charged with a crime, the judge
might adjourn the proceeding or suspend the sentence and direct a warrant
for the defendant's appearance to conduct a hearing (analogous to one on
insanity) and examination. If the court deemed the person a "sexual
psychopath," the statute mandated indefinite institutionalization in a state
9. People v. Bamett, 166 P.2d 4, 9 (Cal. 1946).
10. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5500-5501 (1945).
2008]
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hospital for the mentally ill or insane. According to section 5500, "sexual
psychopath means any person who is affected, in a form predisposing to
the commission of sexual offenses (against children), and in a degree
constituting him a menace to the health or safety of others, with any of the
following conditions: (a) Mental disease or disorder. (b) Psychopathic
personality. (c) Marked departures from normal mentality."" As the
Barnett court explained parenthetically, however, "[t]he words 'against
children' which appear in brackets in the above section were in effect at
the time of the trial of this case but were deleted by amendment in
1945. ' '12 This qualification related directly to the case under review, since
none of the defendant's alleged victims was fourteen or younger, the age
to which California courts had construed the word "children" in the statute
to refer.
In compliance with the statute, the defendant's brother submitted an
affidavit to the trial court averring, among other things, that the
defendant's "departures from normal mentality" encompassed disorders
"concerning all things sexual .. . ."" The affidavit opined that the
defendant's "innate organic inability to profit by experience, to fit into
social patterns of behavior, or to respond to self discipline, together with
the whole mental picture, indicate the presence of a psychopathic
personality ....", His brother first described the defendant as a
homosexual who engaged in sexual offenses with boys ranging in age
from thirteen to eighteen. He then concluded, "but ... the central core of
his sexual aberration and variation consists of the fixation of attraction,
ideation in both consciousness and in his dreams, of boys of 14 or
immature years."' 5 What emerges from this final statement is a portrait of
the defendant's interior world: not specific offenses or acts, nor even a
predilection to commit such offenses or acts, but rather the contents of a
fantasy life, both conscious and unconscious, that revolved around pre-
adolescent boys. Indeed, his fantasies take on more legal significance than
does his actual conduct.
While the brother's affidavit characterized the defendant's sexual
condition in general terms, focusing on his "departures from normal
mentality" insofar as they led to or suggested the involvement of children
as sexual objects, a medical statement, signed by two physicians and
submitted with the affidavit, concentrated instead on the defendant's
homosexuality.
He suffers from a congenital condition technically known as
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inversion. He is an Invert, a type of individual in whom not only is
there defective microscopic brain structure, but in addition to this
brain defect a congenital veriation [sic] in the structure of endocrine
glands which have a determining effect upon character. Such persons
all have psychopathic personalities and when their sex life is
considered, are Sexual Psychopaths.... He is in sexual matters an
Invert: i.e. one whose interest sexually has been turned congenitally
by a power outside of him and apart from any consideration of free
will to a condition where he is interested in, attracted by and obtains
sexual satisfaction from his own sex. When this results in obvious
and unlawful, as well as shocking and indecent, anomalies in sexual
behavior, such acts should be considered not as vicious
manifestations of a perverted free will, but rather as the unfortunate
and destructive results of a congenitally bad brain and glandular
makeup under the influence of the bad habits of a corrupt
environment. 1
6
In this highly deterministic medical account, the defendant was a "type
of individual," someone with both a "brain defect" and a glandular one, an
"Invert" whose acts originated not from some "perverted free will," but
rather from his organs and his glands, whose inherent flaws are
exacerbated by a "corrupt environment." Elsewhere in the opinion,
another physician pointed to external manifestations of the defendant's
internal defects: a broadened pelvis, a feminine manner of "associat[ing]
words one with the other," likes and dislikes properly belonging to a
woman.17 The defendant's gender nonconformity and same-sex desires,
attributed to a diseased endocrine system, seemed to manifest
symmetrically in corporeal and psychical deviance-a condition
amounting to psychopathy.
The appellate court held that the trial judge abused his discretion in
denying the defendant a hearing to determine his status, although the
statute expressly permitted the trial court to decide whether or not to order
such a hearing based on the persuasive value of the affidavit and other
documents. Here, in the court's view, the physicians' statements left
virtually no ambiguity: their diagnostic evidence rendered a hearing on the
defendant's status compulsory. Hence, the focus of the legal process
against the defendant shifted inexorably from an adjudication of the
criminal charges against him to an adjudication of his status.
C. Medico-legal reasoning and "the homosexual"
In the years leading up to Barnett, medico-legal experts launched the
field of sexual psychopathology, diagnosing and regulating as
16. Id.
17. id. at 7-8.
2008]
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psychopathic an assortment of non-normative sexual inclinations and
practices." This medical and legal category was not unique to California,
but rather gained national currency in the mid-twentieth century, resulting
in the enactment of special laws in approximately half of the states.
Sexual psychopathy found its most salient incarnation in the figure of the
homosexual. Thus Barnett dramatizes several issues that became central
to medico-legal discourse during this period, particularly with respect to
sexuality. First, homosexuality emerges as an identity category with
clearly distinguishing features that putatively reflect a lack of self-control,
an inability to exercise free will, and the absence of a stable, coherent self
capable of conforming to social mandates. In Barnett, evidence of
homosexuality as a psychological, neurological and endocrinological
condition became sufficient to indicate that the defendant was most likely
a "sexual psychopath," in need of indefinite hospitalization.
Moreover, courts imputed specialized knowledge and insight to medical
experts on the question of a defendant's status. Indeed, by 1946 the
understanding of homosexuality as a mental disorder had so eclipsed other
models that the court identified an abuse of discretion in the trial judge's
lack of deference toward the physicians. Those who previously had been
simple criminals, violators of legal and social strictures, had become
medical enigmas, too complex for all but the most highly trained doctors.
Finally, the defendant's identity, quite apart from the acts he committed,
emerged as the gravamen of the decision. Here the legal category of
"sexual psychopath" diverted the focus from actual acts to a
"predispos[ition]" to commit those acts such that the acts themselves
became nearly irrelevant in the face of a weak or nonexistent will.
Indeed, the emergence of "the homosexual" as a juridical category in
this period came to stand for the very irresistible impulses and
ungovernability that mark the dissolution of the rational, bounded subject
of law. This figure bears the legacy of a conversation between law and
psychiatry about the possibilities and limits of a partnership between the
two disciplines, one in which sexuality played an increasingly significant
role. While this partnership addressed social ills of various kinds, from
criminality to mental disorder, sexuality and its apparent misdirections
took on particular significance. Psychiatric reasoning focused on the
18. See, e.g., Samuel J. Brakel & James L. Cavanaugh, Jr., Of Psychopaths and Pendulums: Legal
and Psychiatric Treatment of Sex Offenders in the United States, 30 N.M. L. REV. 69 (2000); Deborah
W. Denno, Life Before the Modern Sex Offender Statutes, 92 Nw. L. REV. 1317 (1998); John Pratt, Sex
Offender Law in Historical Context: The Rise and Fall of Homophobia and Sexual Psychopath
Legislation in Postwar Society, 4 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 25 (1998); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Law and
the Construction of the Closet: American Regulation of Same-Sex Intimacy, 1880-1946, 82 IOWA L.
REV. 1007 (1997); Estelle Freedman, "Uncontrolled Desire": The Response to the Sexual
Psychopath, 1920-1960, 74 J. AMERICAN HIST. 83, 87 (1987); Alan H. Swanson, Sexual Psychopath
Statutes: Summary and Analysis. 51 J. GRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 215 (1960); Edwin H. Sutherland, The
Sexual Psychopath Laws, 40 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 543 (1950).
[20:163
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individual and on assigning and elaborating upon an identity for that
individual, effectively diverting the popular and legal gaze from deviant
acts to deviant persons. Indeed, medico-legal discourse followed the
insights of psychoanalysis to forge a link between sexual and criminal
impulses that posed a significant challenge to the traditional approach of
American criminal law and penal policy.
Scholars of sexuality have demonstrated convincingly how sexual
taxonomies, in existence since the late nineteenth century, that have
attempted neatly to divide the world into homosexuals and heterosexuals
operate according a logic of suspicion and contagion that belies such neat
categorization. As Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick explained in her
groundbreaking Epistemology of the Closet, "[t]o be gay, or to be
potentially classifiable as gay ... is to come under the radically
overlapping aegises of a universalizing discourse of acts or bonds and at
the same time of a minoritizing discourse of kinds of persons."' 9 In other
words, homosexuality is at once a quality constitutive of and confined to a
discrete subculture and a contagious condition or tempting set of practices
threatening to infect the rest of the population, within whom its potential
remains incipient. But the ostensibly minoritizing approach that
characterized medico-legal accounts of deviance threatened frequently to
erode the boundary separating normality from deviance or pathology, and
thus to become universalizing in scope.
II. PSYCHIATRIC EXPERTISE AND THE UNFREE WILL
Below I offer a brief account of the relationship between psychiatry and
law as it evolved around questions of criminal responsibility and legal
insanity. With the evolution of new categories of mental disorder on a
continuum between insanity and putatively normal psychic life came a
new prominence for professional communities intent on classifying and
investigating psychological abnormalities.
A. Psychiatry and law: early affinities and antagonisms
Psychiatric involvement in legal processes traverses a venerable history
that encompasses far more than the invention of the sexual psychopath and
the general medical concern with sexual pathologies. But in the annals of
psychiatric jurisprudence, the turn to sexuality marked a significant step in
expanding the field of influence for a somewhat beleaguered medical
discipline. From its inception as a specialized field of medicine in the
1820s and 1830s, psychiatry occupied the margins of the medical
19. EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 54 (1990). See generally Janet
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profession, which itself had yet to ascend to the level of professional
prestige it has occupied since the beginning of the twentieth century.20
While quickly seizing institutional jurisdiction over the insane, psychiatry
did not enter into a direct conversation with law regarding the legal
consequences of madness until well into the nineteenth century.2'
Questions of legal sanity, which arose in the context of wills, contracts
and guardianship proceedings as well as criminal offenses, previously had
not called for particularly medical expertise.22 By the mid-nineteenth
century, however, psychiatric concerns were evolving in a dynamic
relation to legal ones: both converged around issues of legal, and
especially criminal, responsibility. In 1844, hospital directors established
the Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for
the Insane, later to become the American Psychiatric Association. Doctor
Isaac Ray, a founder of the Association, generated one of the first attempts
to influence the development of the law on the part of a still juvenile
profession with his 1838 treatise Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity.
Ray's treatise urged recognition of a version of moral insanitya3-a
volitional disorder that putatively diminished or even eradicated impulse
control-to supplement the reigning conception of insanity as an inability
to tell right from wrong:
[W]e see the faculty thus affected, prompting the individual to action
by a kind of instinctive irresistibility, and while he retains the most
perfect consciousness of the impropriety and even enormity of his
conduct, he deliberately and perversely pursues it. With no
extraordinary temptation to sin, but on the contrary, with every
inducement to refrain from it, and apparently in full possession of his
reason, he commits a crime whose motives are equally inexplicable
to himself and to others.24
Here Ray effectively articulated a dissonance between conscious
knowledge and unconscious motivation, decades before the unconscious
and its desires would ground a novel conception of the self in
psychoanalytic thought.
20. See generally ELIZABETH LUNBECK, THE PSYCHIATRIC PERSUASION: KNOWLEDGE, GENDER,
AND POWER IN MODERN AMERICA 27 (1994).
21. See, e.g., THOMAS MAEDER, CRIME AND MADNESS: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE
INSANITY DEFENSE 36-51 (1985).
22. See id. at 27; see also Robert E. Mensel, Feeling Right and Knowing Right: Insanity in
Testators and Criminals in Nineteenth Century American Law, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 397 (2005)
(contrasting evolving doctrines of insanity in nineteenth-century criminal and inheritance cases).
23. In his 1835 Treatise on Insanity, the English physician James Cowles Prichard coined the
term "moral insanity" to describe a disorder of the sphere of emotion and impulse as an alternative to
intellectual, or cognitive, insanity. He linked this disorder specifically to a failure of self-government.
J.C. PRICHARD, TREATISE ON INSANITY 15 (1835); see also HENRY WERLINDER, PSYCHOPATHY: A
HISTORY OF THE CONCEPTS 35 (1978).
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As mid-twentieth-century psychiatrists were quick to point out,
however, psychiatry's direct involvement in shaping legal standards was
severely attenuated in the century that gave rise to the "M'Naghten" test of
legal insanity in 1843. This judge-designed test privileged cognitive
factors over volitional ones, asking whether a defendant "knew" the nature
and wrongfulness of her acts. 5 One later critic of that test asserted that
"[t]he point to be emphasized here... is that, while current medico-
psychological ideas were obviously used by the [M'Naghten] judges, the
concept was the product of the judiciary only."26 A voluminous literature
exists documenting and analyzing the evolution of the insanity defense in
Anglo-American jurisprudence, and it is not within the scope of this article
to contribute to that project.27 What is significant for the purpose of my
discussion here is the extent to which psychiatrists, while participating in
debates about the nature of insanity in the context of the criminal law,
were nonetheless limited in their ability to shape legal standards.28
Members of the medical community complained that the M'Naghten test
disregarded modem research on human psychology and, later in the
century, neurology suggesting the existence of "moral" or volitional
disorders.2 9  Nonetheless, this test dominated Anglo-American law, with
few exceptions, until well into the last century and has resumed its
privileged position over the past few decades.3 °
25. The House of Lords opined "that the jury ought to be told in all cases that every man is to be
presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until
the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that, to establish a defence on the ground of insanity it
must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was labouring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he
was doing, or if he did know it that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." Daniel
M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 8 ENG. REP. 718, 722 (H.L.).
26. Gregory Zilboorg, Misconceptions of Legal Insanity, 9 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 540, 542
(1939).
27. See generally Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental
Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199 (2000); MICHAEL PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1994); RITA J. SIMON & DAVID E. AARONSON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF LAW AND POLICY IN THE POST-HINCKLEY ERA (1989); DONALD H. J.
HERMANN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: PHILOSOPHICAL, HISTORICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (1983);
Alan Stone, The Insanity Defense on Trial, 33 HARV. L. SCH. BULL. 15 (1982).
28. This territorialism on the part of lawmakers with respect to medico-legal issues was not
confined to the area of psychiatry; on the contrary, lawmakers were, and have remained, reluctant to
abdicate authority on a wide range of medico-legal questions. See JAMES C. MOHR, DOCTORS AND
THE LAW: MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 252 (1993).
29. See MAEDER, supra note 21, at 46-48. Indeed, even before the adoption of the M'Naghten
rule, Isaac Ray dismissed as arrogant and uninformed any definition of insanity measured solely
against rationality: "that the insane mind is not entirely deprived of this power of moral discernment,
but in many subjects is perfectly rational, and displays the exercise of a sound and well balanced mind
is one of those facts now so well established, that to question it would only betray the height of
ignorance and presumption." RAY, supra note 24, at 32.
30. Following the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity in the 1981 trial of John Hinckley for
the attempted assassination of President Reagan, many states and the federal government reinstated a
narrow test for insanity in place of the more expansive ones reflected in the ALl and "product" rules.
Indeed, a majority of jurisdictions now limit insanity verdicts to defendants who meet the M'Naghten
standards or even more stringent criteria, and a few have eliminated the defense altogether. See Clark
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Judicial resistance to the irresistible impulse approach rested in part on
the sense that law existed precisely to discourage and ultimately to punish
capitulation to those impulses that threatened social order. Moreover,
judges and others perceived an insurmountable difficulty in identifying
persons in whom mental disorder prevented the exercise of self-restraint-
as opposed to "normal" criminals. Such convictions lay behind the
skeptical pronouncement that the proverbial "policeman at one's elbow" 3'
would rid us of the problem of so-called irresistible impulse: one may
resist under legal surveillance what seems irresistible without it. For
example, in 1908 a Canadian judge elaborated this position as follows:
"The law says to men who say they are afflicted with irresistible impulses:
If you cannot resist an impulse in any other way, we will hang a rope in
front of your eyes, and perhaps that will help." 32  This reasoning
demonstrated both a faith in law's efficacy and a well entrenched belief
that legal subjects are capable of adhering to the law, although some have
failed adequately to internalize discipline and still require the threat of
punishment. Otherwise any number of deviations from the codes of
appropriate behavior might be deemed insanity and insanity thereby
implicated in daily life.
In the 1860s, Ray collaborated with Justice Charles Doe of the New
Hampshire Supreme Court to formulate a more elastic test of legal
insanity that aspired to move beyond both M'Naghten and irresistible
impulse, one that focused on whether the defendant's mental disease
produced her behavior rather than on the precise nature of the defendant's
mental state.33 Yet this test--dubbed the "product test"-remained unique
to New Hampshire until Judge David Bazelon of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, famously a champion of psychiatric insights and
protector of the mentally ill, embraced it in the 1954 case Durham v.
United States.34 Largely due to the fluidity of psychiatric knowledge and
the instability of its categories, however, Bazelon abandoned this approach
some years later while concurring in a 1972 opinion35 that adopted the
Model Penal Code's formulation for insanity. This test, which once
prevailed in federal law as well as many of the states, looks to whether as
v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 736, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2721-22.
31. A Michigan court recently glossed this test thus: "would defendant have committed the crimes
had there been a policeman at his elbow at the time?" People v. Jackson, 627 N.W.2d 11, 12 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2001).
32. King v. Creighton, [1908] 14 Canadian Criminal Cases 349 (Can.).
33. This collaboration resulted in the decisions State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870) (excusing a
defendant from criminal responsibility "if the homicide was the offspring or product of mental
disease"), and State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871) ("No man shall be held accountable, criminally, for
an act which was the offspring and product of mental disease.").
34. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954), held that "an accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect."
35. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1010-11 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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a "result of mental disease or defect" the defendant lacked "substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law. ' 36 No formula to determine legal
insanity has met with widespread approbation, since every test potentially
proves both too much and too little. Prevailing standards for insanity may
demand the acquittal of defendants popularly deemed responsible, while
simultaneously permitting defendants with evident mental disturbances to
languish in prison or to receive heavy doses of psychotropic medications
in order to meet competency requirements.
Legal determinations of insanity derive their importance from the need
to ascertain culpability, a quality predicated on principles of autonomy and
central to conceptions of the juridical subject and to our legal and political
cultures more generally. Before many states replaced the M'Naghten test
for legal insanity with ones incorporating psychiatric insights, an
American psychiatrist noted in 1939 that many small children would fail
the M'Naghten test, and yet we would never impose comparable criminal
liability on children.
The law automatically assumes that a child committing a felony does
not know the nature and quality of the act and does not know that it is
wrong. Yet a child of moderate brightness will say that he hit his
sister on the head, that she bled and then she fell; he will even admit
that she died or that he killed her and will perhaps say that he was
wrong to kill his sister. The criminal code does not accept this
knowledge as valid; without knowing it the law itself recognizes here
a fundamental medico-psychological distinction between the purely
verbal knowledge which characterizes the child and the other type of
knowledge which characterizes the adult.37
This analogy between children and the legally insane, although not a
new one in cultural responses to madness, illuminates a fundamental
question that subtended, and continues to inform, legal debates about the
nature and parameters of legal insanity: Who is a legal subject, bound and
entitled by law? Which qualities are required of this subject? The
example of the canny but impulsive child here suggests a more restrictive
purview for the legally sane, and thus for the legal subject, than did
reigning legal models. In this sense, debates about insanity retained the
potential to refine the definition of the legal subject even as they wrestled
with expanding the purview of criminal irresponsibility.38 Indeed, to the
36. A.L.I., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1955).
37. Zilboorg, supra note 26, at 552. Of course, this view eroded significantly in the late-twentieth
century as ever-younger children were tried as adults.
38. Professor Stephen J. Morse, one of the most prolific advocates of reason and responsibility as
predicates of legal personhood, contends that "[t]he law's concept of responsibility follows logically
from its conception of the person and the nature of law itself. As a system of rules that guides and
governs human interaction, law tells citizens what they may and may not do, what they must or must
not do ... and what consequences will follow from their conduct. Unless human beings were rational
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extent that the object of these debates was a more precise definition of this
subject, lawyers and judges held jealously to the project and its terms as
their own.
The difference between the cognitive and volitional approaches to the
determination of criminal responsibility turns on two premises critical to
post-Enlightenment legal thought: the presumption of reason, of the
immanence of logic and the priority of cognition; and the presumption of
free will, of the ability to choose one's movements and to control one's
actions.39 In his 1927 treatise on psychiatric jurisprudence Mental
Disorder and the Criminal Law, Sheldon Glueck, a prominent figure in
the early twentieth-century dialogue between psychiatry and law,
approvingly cited Lord Chief Justice of England Matthew Hale's
eighteenth-century treatise Pleas of the Crown for its precocious
appreciation of the significance of mental and emotional capacity to the
tenets of law.4 ° In particular, he lauded Hale's recognition of the
"psychological and ethical fundamentals of the criminal law, so often
ignored by writers and judges . ". . . " On the question of incapacity and
exemption from culpability, Hale's treatise underscores the centrality of
rationality and free will to conceptions of the legal subject underlying the
Enlightenment vision of law:
Man is naturally endowed with these two faculties, understanding and
liberty of will, and therefore is a subject properly capable of a law
properly so called, and consequently obnoxious to guilt and
punishment for the violation of that law, which in respect of these
two great faculties he hath a capacity to obey: The consent of the will
is that, which renders human actions either commendable or culpable;
as where there is no law, there is no transgression, so regularly where
there is no will to commit an offense, there can be no transgression,
or just reason to incur the penalty or sanction of that law instituted for
the punishment of crimes or offenses. And because the liberty or
creatures who could understand the good reasons for actions.., and could conform to legal
requirements through intentional action, the law would be powerless to affect human action." Stephen
J. Morse, Crazy Reasons, 10 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 189, 192 (1999).
39. American jurisprudence has repeatedly confirmed the significance of these tenets to the
functioning of our legal system. For instance, Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952)
affirmed a "universal and persistent" belief in "freedom of the human will and a consequent ability to
choose between good and evil" that characterizes "mature systems of law." See also United States v.
Brawner, 471 F.2d 966, 968 (Ct. App. D.C. 1972) ("The courts have emphasized over the centuries
that 'free will' is the postulate of responsibility under our jurisprudence."); Michelle Cotton, A Foolish
Consistency: Keeping Determinism Out of the Criminal Law, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (2005) (arguing
that free will is more firmly ensconced in American criminal law now than at any time since the first
half of the twentieth century); Ronald J. Rychlak & Joseph F. Rychlak, Mental Health Experts on
Trial: Free Will and Determinism in the Courtroom, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 193 (1997) (contending that
the deterministic view of many social scientists is incompatible with the requirements of the legal
system).
40. See S. SHELDON GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: A STUDY IN
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choice of the will presupposeth an act of the understanding to know
the thing or action chosen by the will, it follows that, where there is a
total defect of the understanding, there is no free act of the will in the
choice of things or actions.42
Notwithstanding what he called Hale's "simplified psychology," Glueck
applauded Hale for evincing a more nuanced understanding of mental
incapacity and its vicissitudes than did some of his nineteenth-century
successors. a3 Hale's account of law and "proper" legal subjects here
suggested an approach extending beyond mere cognition in its search for
legal responsibility; it conceived of the will as a separate, though related,
faculty. Indeed, Hale rhetorically analogized the will to law itself: where
there is no will, as where there is no law, there can be no transgression.
One whose will is compromised, whether by a lack of cognition or by
some other force acting upon it, is in effect lawless, outside of the law.
But despite Lord Hale's apparent recognition of its significance, this
volitional conception of insanity, embraced by many psychiatrists,
generally remained foreign to legal rulemaking in the centuries that
followed.
Neither members of the legal profession nor doctors have arrived at a
consensus definition of legal insanity; indeed this question has proven
vexing to doctors as well as to lawyers, legislators, and judges precisely
because of the tenacity of these Enlightenment ideals." Nonetheless,
when psychiatry was attempting to achieve institutional legitimacy, the
problem of insanity offered its professionals one arena of potential
expertise and influence. Given the difficulties that attend any definition of
insanity compatible with an unshakable faith in free will and with the
opacity of mental processes, however, psychiatric expertise in diagnosing
insanity failed to provide a bulwark that would ensure professional
prestige and authority. What one historian refers to as a kind of "medico-
legal nightmare" was the early but enduring progeny of this collaborative
venture between psychiatry and law. 5
42. M. HALE, 1 PLEAS OF THE CROWN 14-15 (1736).
43. See Glueck, supra note 40, at 132.
44. What Glueck identified in 1925 as "chaos" in the field of insanity jurisprudence, see id. at
188, found a more recent echo in an article by prominent mental health law scholar Chrisopher
Slobogin. The article commences with the observation that "[i]nsanity defense jurisprudence has long
been in a state of chaos." Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental
Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REv. 1199 (2000).
45. MOHR, supra note 28, at 254. Despite its shortcomings, many commentators have suggested
that even an imperfect insanity defense (most likely unavoidable, since "insanity" has been solely a
legal category since psychiatrists essentially abandoned it in the late nineteenth century) remains
necessary for the criminal law to be perceived as legitimate.
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B. The new face ofpsychiatry
1. Beyond the asylum
Consigned to treating the insane in the ghettoized world of the asylum,
psychiatry as a profession was in crisis by the end of the nineteenth
century.46  Psychiatrists functioned primarily as custodians of the
institutions where those suffering from mental illness were sequestered,
segregated from the majority of American society. They progressed little
in their scientific inquiry and could no more explain the origins of insanity
than they could offer a cure.47
As the nineteenth century neared its end, psychiatry began to refashion
itself as a profession more concerned with problems affecting the
population at large than with those solely affecting its most marginalized
members. The science of neurology, which gained ascendancy during the
second half of the nineteenth century among professionals interested in
mental processes, informed the psychological research of the young doctor
Sigmund Freud and others. This focus on the brain would soon yield to an
even more influential theory of the mind, which departed in large part
from the biologism that dominated nineteenth-century understandings of
human behavior. 48 The early decades of the twentieth century saw a shift
in the psychiatrist's focus toward the world beyond the asylum, an
institution which itself declined in importance, giving way to hospitals,
clinics, and eventually to private practice. Psychiatric interest turned
toward mental problems short of insanity, ones that potentially affected
everyone; thus the psychiatric purview expanded to include society at
large rather than merely the alternative world of severe mental illness.
The mental hygiene movement in America emerged out of a concern for
and an interest in mental health as an issue of public health. 49 Founded in
1909, the movement coincided with the disciplinary and therefore
normalizing-as opposed to strictly punitive-Progressive-era approach to
deviance.50 Psychiatry and psychology, as burgeoning fields of study and
46. See EDWARD SHORTER, A HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE ERA OF THE ASYLUM TO THE
AGE OF PROZAC 65 (1997).
47. See id.; see also NICOLE HAHN RAFTER, CREATING BORN CRIMINALS 169 (1997).
48. See Arnold Davidson, Closing up the Corpses: Diseases of Sexuality and the Emergence of
the Psychiatric Style of Reasoning, in MEANING AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HILARY
PUTNAM 295 (George Boolos ed., 1990), for a fascinating discussion of this late-nineteenth-century
shift from brain to mind in the context of sexuality and the origins of sexual deviance.
49. See LUNBECK, supra note 20 at 22-23; see also GERALD GROB, MENTAL ILLNESS IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY 1875-1940, 145 (1983).
50. See, for example, Jonathan Simon's description of Progressive-era penology and its
disciplinary legacy, in Jonathan Simon, Ghosts of the Disciplinary Machine: Lee Harvey Oswald, Life-
History, and the Truth of Crime, 10 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 75, 82-83 (1998); see also John Chynoweth
Burnham, Psychiatry, Psychology and the Progressive Movement, 12 AM. QUART. 457 (1960);
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practice, exemplified the Progressive conviction that people were products
of their social environments. Students of the human psyche believed that
their subjects could learn to adapt better to those environments and
ultimately exercise control over them in ways that would vanquish most
social ills. In a departure from older models of psychiatry and from the
perspective represented by the American Pathological Association,
founded at roughly the same time (1910), mental hygiene was interested
less in psychopathology per se and more in devising measures to ensure a
more mentally "hygienic" population. Unlike other movements in this
period that were changing the face of psychological investigation, most
notably psychoanalysis, mental hygiene focused on removing the
pathogens that produced illness and promoting healthy social and familial
interactions." In this way, mental hygiene also reflected the Progressive-
era investment in childhood as a means to intercept potential delinquency
and more developed forms of criminality. 2  Creation of the
Orthopsychiatric Association in 1924 further signaled a growing interest
in the relationship between psychiatric goals and techniques and broad
social concerns.
Criminality presented an area of particular interest for the psychological
and psychiatric professions, since therein lay a field of inquiry with great
potential for influence over public policy and social regulation. 3 Indeed,
a kind of professional battle over jurisdiction in this area ensued between
the disciplines of psychiatry and psychology, the latter of which defined
itself as a profession specializing in large-scale quantitative diagnosis and
testing along the lines of the burgeoning social sciences. As a result of
this battle, the intelligence-testing techniques of psychologists ultimately
yielded to the new "life-history" approach of psychiatry, influenced by
psychoanalysis, with respect to the treatment and diagnosis of criminality.
Within the individualized focus this approach represented, the figure of
the "psychopath," first in circulation in the nineteenth century but not
prominent until the early twentieth, gained a certain celebrity.
The concept of psychopathy, or diseases of the mind, suggested that
disorders other than strictly neurological ones, or ones detectable by
51. PHILIP CUSHMAN, CONSTRUCTING THE SELF, CONSTRUCTING AMERICA: A CULTURAL
HISTORY OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 152 (1995) (describing mental hygiene's central paradigm as "typically
American" in this sense); see also Leonard S. Cottrell & Ruth Gallagher, Important Developments in
American Social Psychology During the Past Decade, 4 SOCIOMETRY 107, 122 (1941).
52. See, e.g., Anne C. Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 IOWA L. REV. 431, 440 (2006); Barry
Field, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle Offense: Punishment, Treatment and the Difference it
Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821 (1998); Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Childrens' Rights? 80
MINN. L. REV. 267, 278-80 (1995); David J. Rothman, The State as Parent: Social Policy in the
Progressive Era in W. GAYLIN ET AL., DOING GOOD: THE LIMITS OF BENEVOLENCE (1978).
53. See Herman Adler, Psychiatry Applied to Criminology in the United States, 24 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 50, 51 (1933) ("One thing stands out as the result of the past twenty-five years of work in
psychiatry in this country, and that is that the disorders of human behavior, which include criminal
behavior, must claim an important share of the interest and responsibility of psychiatry.").
2008]
17
Schmeiser: The Ungovernable Citizen
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2008
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
psychological testing, lay behind much antisocial behavior. Since the
Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso had linked criminality to a
hereditary weakness that manifested itself in mental disorder, psychopathy
and crime had seemed productively entwined.54 Later, the psychiatrist
Adolf Meyer was largely responsible for acquainting his American
colleagues with the concept of psychopathy and its European elaborations
(psychopathic inferiority, psychopathic constitution, and psychopathic
personality)." The study and diagnosis of psychopathy seemed to require
an interpretive approach, one that took account of a variety of factors,
including individual development, heredity, and recognizable symptom-
formation. This approach found one early exemplar in the Viennese
physician Richard von Krafft-Ebing's tome Psychopathia Sexualis, 56 a
compendium of case studies and taxonomies relating B.A. Morel's theory
of degeneration 57 to sexual deviance, first published in the United States in
1894 and widely available by the 1920s.
2. The illnesses of war
The First World War provided a significant occasion for the expansion
of psychiatric authority. The manifold neuroses with which soldiers
returned from their experiences in battle, as well as the difficulties many
of them suffered in their attempts to reintegrate into society, all
contributed to a newly influential psychiatric culture.58 In the recollection
of an eminent psychiatrist trained during this period, "the force that
catapulted the need for, and the growth of, a new psychiatry came chiefly
from World War I with its military tragedies, social dislocations, and
psychological pressures.- 59  Among these psychological pressures were
54. See CESARE LOMBROSO, THE BORN CRIMINAL (1 st ed. 1876); see also RAFTER, supra note 47
at 183; Jonathan Simon, Positively Punitive: How the Inventor of Scientific Criminology Who Died at
the Beginning of the Twentieth Century Continues to Haunt Crime Control at the Beginning of the
Twenty-first, 84 TEX. L. REV., 2135, 2142-65 (2006).
55. See HENRY WERLINDER, PSYCHOPATHY: A HISTORY OF THE CONCEPTS 142-43, 145 (1978).
56. RICHARD VON KRAFFT-EBING, PSYCHOPATHIA SEXUALIS (1886).
57. Psychiatrist Morel began propounding the idea of degeneration, or the hereditary progression
of mental illness, in 1857. See generally BtNtDICT MOREL, TRAITt DES DEGENERESCENCES
PHYSIQUES, INTELLECTUELLES ET MORALES DE L'ESPECE HUMAINE (1857). The concept of
degeneration achieved immense popularity in Europe over the succeeding decades, and was deployed
to explain everything from criminality to the decline of the aristocracy to sexual deviance. For
discussions of degeneration, see SHORTER, supra note 46, at 93-99; DEGENERATION: THE DARK SIDE
OF PROGRESS (Sander L. Gilman & J. Edward Chamberlin eds., 1985); SANDER L. GILMAN,
DIFFERENCE AND PATHOLOGY: STEREOTYPES OF SEXUALITY, RACE AND MADNESS 191- 216 (1987).
58. For example, the notion of "shell shock" first emerged during this period in England,
becoming one basis for a newly authoritative psychoanalytic culture. See BEN SHEPHARD, A WAR OF
NERVES: SOLDIERS AND PSYCHIATRISTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2001); FREUD, ET AL.,
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE WAR NEUROSIS (1921); TED BOGACZ, War Neurosis and Cultural
Change in England, 1914-22: The Work of the War Office Committee of Enquiry into 'Shell-Shock,'
24 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 227 (1989). War neuroses affecting soldiers who returned from the front inform
the plots of Rebecca West's THE RETURN OF THE SOLDIER (1918) and Virgina Woolf's MRS.
DALLOWAY (1925).
59. WALTER BROMBERG, PSYCHIATRY BETWEEN THE WARS: A RECOLLECTION 5 (1982).
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antisocial tendencies whose origins remained obscure, requiring the
detection of a trained professional.
Following World War 1, then, psychiatrists and psychologists developed
a particular interest in irresistible impulses manifesting themselves in
soldiers returned from battle.6" Glueck alluded to the effects of the Great
War in Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law. In the section entitled
"Disorders of the Impulses," he described "the case of a soldier in the
World War who, after his return to civilian life, was afraid to go out for a
walk with one companion, for fear of being seized with an impulse to kill
him...."61  Such impulses, consuming a reluctant actor, confirmed once
again the limitations of the M'Naghten model of insanity, with its
exclusive focus on cognition.
In addition to reinforcing the existence and significance of volitional
disorders, the war, combined with the importation and Americanization of
psychoanalysis, 62 facilitated the shifting of psychiatric inquiry from
madness qua madness to a whole variety of mental and emotional
maladies. The image of the soldier, emasculated by wounds that were as
much psychic as they were corporeal, informed the newly charged interest
in the figure of the psychopath, the man (almost invariably) who
outwardly resembled his peers but inwardly hosted a variety of antisocial
and potentially dangerous inclinations.63
C. Criminality without reason
As psychiatry departed from its focus on insanity and began studying
and treating a broader range of psychological ailments, then, it embraced a
methodology informed by psychoanalysis and more interested in a
person's life history than in her cognitive functions. What one
contemporary called the new "dynamic psychology"64 gained national
prominence during the widely covered and closely followed Chicago trial
60. A series of medico-legal case studies that appeared in the California Law Review in 1921
included one of a former soldier, returned from battle, who suffered from an irresistible impulse
toward flight. The article listed this case under an analysis of psychopathic personality, detailing the
effect of the war, and shell shock in particular, in triggering latent or incipient psychopathy. See The
Relation of Law and Medicine in Mental Disease, 9 CAL. L. REv. 276, 293 (1921).
61. GLUECK, supra note 36, at 306.
62. Freud made his fateful visit to the United States in 1909 to deliver a series of lectures at Clark
University, leaving behind many disciples. See generally NATHAN G. HALE, JR., FREUD AND THE
AMERICANS: THE BEGINNINGS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1876-1917 (1971); THE
RISE AND CRISIS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IN THE UNITED STATES: FREUD AND THE AMERICANS, 1917-
1985 (1995).
63. Carolyn Dean describes warfare in the First World War as no longer a proving ground of
manhood, but rather "a rationalized, dehumanized process in which men sat in miles of trenches up to
their necks in water with dead comrades and rats and passively awaited gunfire from an enemy they
could not see." Carolyn Dean, SEXUALITY AND MODERN WESTERN CULTURE 39 (1995).
64. See Editorial, The Crime and Trial of Loeb and Leopold, 19 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 223, 224 (1924).
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of Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb in 1924.65 Leopold and Loeb were
the eighteen and nineteen-year-old killers of a neighborhood boy,
Leopold's younger cousin. According to their confession, they committed
the murder for no other reason than "to experience a hitherto untasted
'thrill' and to plan and carry out a 'perfect crime. '"'66 News coverage of
the case kept national attention riveted on its developments.67 Upon the
advice of their distinguished lawyer Clarence L. Darrow, the defendants
pled guilty, declining to offer a complete defense of legal insanity (the
standard for which would have followed the M'Naghten rule); yet the
defense nonetheless made the defendants' psychological conditioning and
pathologies the gravamen of its case to combat the prosecution's request
for the death penalty. 68 During a mitigation hearing before the judge, the
defense team engaged a variety of medical and psychological experts to
argue for the defendants' diminished capacity in light of their "abnormal"
mental condition.69  Darrow's strategy thus shifted the focus from legal
insanity to the more elastic category of mental abnormality.
Local journalist Maureen McKernan, who covered the trial for the
Chicago Herald and Examiner, collected her observations of the case in
The Amazing Crime and Trial of Leopold and Loeb. In her account, as
well as in other contemporary reflections on the case, "[t]he trial became a
contest in psychology and for days the air was thick with terms-'split
personalities,' 'phantasies,' 'subconscious influence,' 'basal
metabolism'-which the alienists and neurologists of the two sides of the
case hurled back and forth before the judge."7 While this was by no
means the first prominent American trial in which expert psychiatric
testimony provided the hermeneutic framework for understanding the
crime and its perpetrators,7 it did occasion the first popular dissemination
65. See generally Scott W. Howe, Reassessing the Individualization Mandate in Capital
Sentencing: Darrow's Defense of Leopold and Loeb, 79 IOWA L. REv. 989, 994-1012 (1994); Denno,
supra note 18 at 1223-36.
66. M. Hamblin Smith & Anne Fairweather, The Case of Richard Loeb and Nathan Leopold, 71 J.
MENTAL SCI. 80, 81 (1925). See also The Plea of Clarence Darrow, reproduced in MAUREEN
McKERNAN, THE AMAZING CRIME AND TRIAL OF LEOPOLD AND LOEB, 160-237 (1924).
67. See generally Paula S. Fass, The Making and Unmaking of an Event: The Leopold and Loeb
Case in American Culture, 90 J. AM. HIST. 923 (1993).
68. Darrow's decision to offer a guilty plea derived from his sense that a jury would likely be
moved by a spirit of vengeance and disgust against the defendants with their privileged backgrounds
and apparent lack of remorse; a judge, on the other hand, might be more receptive to a defense strategy
that would spare their lives if not exculpate them altogether. His prediction proved to be correct. See
Howe, supra note 65, at 1000-1001.
69. For an account of why Freud refused the opportunity to testify on the defendants' behalf, see
Brett Kahr, Why Freud Turned Down $25,000: Mental Health Professionals in the Witness Box, 62
AM. IMAGO 365 (2005).
70. MCKERNAN, supra note 66 at 129.
71. Over forty years earlier, the 1881 trial of President Garfield's assassin Charles J. Guiteau
similarly staged a dramatic debate over the meaning of insanity among a variety of prominent
psychiatrists and neurologists, but this case did not bring the technical aspects of psychiatric diagnosis
into the popular imagination as did the Leopold and Loeb trial. In Guiteau's trial, the defendant
ultimately failed to meet the criteria of insanity, which followed the M'Naghten rules almost exactly;
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of these arcane concepts in the context of a shocking and otherwise
incomprehensible crime.72 Media coverage of the case acquainted the
public with the vocabulary of psychiatric diagnosis and the relevance for
this diagnosis of the intimate details of a person's life. But the interpretive
framework itself, though uniformly psychiatric, proved to be a bifurcated
one. As the authors of a contemporaneous editorial in one psychology
journal put it,
the alienists on the two sides represented two different schools of
psychiatry-the older formal orthodox school and a new school of what
may be called dynamic psychology.... The examinations of the criminals
by the State's experts were limited to the traditional inquiries into the
mental processes, such as 'orientation in time and space', 'memory',
'stream of thought', 'judgment', attention, responsiveness of answers,
'reasoning', knowledge of right and wrong, conduct, superficial motives,
etc.... The second group entered intensively into the inner mental life of
the criminals, into a genetic study of their mental processes, thus taking
into consideration and laying emphasis upon an entirely different and
additional class of alleged facts.73
The editorial concluded that the problem lay with the role of expert
testimony in an adversarial system "under which experts are obliged to
arrive at conclusions and testify."74  An evolving discipline such as
psychiatry, the authors suggested, remained incompatible with the
requirements of a legal regime that asks for definitive answers. While
individual doctors might regard their diagnoses as conclusive rather than
speculative, the field as a whole had not yet coalesced, still caught
between those who represented the rationalist approach of M'Naghten and
those who embraced the more unsettling claims of psychoanalysis.
Based on the evidence and testimony presented in the case, two British
doctors offered their own diagnosis of the two defendants. Citing portions
of the extensive report generated for the defense by two physicians, which
documented among other things the defendants' sexual development, the
content of their fantasies,75 their physiological attributes, and their
he was subsequently hung, thereby occasioning outrage among some in the psychiatric community
both at the time and in later years. See William J. Curran, Legal Psychiatry in the Nineteenth Century,
in PSYCHIATRISTS AND THE LEGAL PROCESS: DIAGNOSIS AND DEBATE 4, 6-8 (Richard J. Bonnie ed.,
1977).
72. As two British doctors who had closely followed the trial proceedings and testimony related
in a psychiatric journal, "The explanations offered by the defence may be summed up as (a) split
personality, (b) psychopathic personality, (c) constitutional inferiority, (d) glandular disorder, or
inferiority, (e) dementia praecox." Smith & Fairweather, supra note 66 at 89.
73. The Crime and Trial of Loeb and Leopold, supra note 64, at 224.
74. Id. at 225. In The Reconciliation of the Legal and Psychiatric Viewpoints of Delinquency, 17
J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 173, 175 (1926), V. C. Branham also contended that the
problems with expert psychiatric testimony in the Leopold-Loeb case and elsewhere were exacerbated
by the requirements of the adversary system.
75. Writing on the importance of fantasy in the lives of the defendants, these physicians described
Leopold as spending "a considerable part of the time each day in the weaving of phantasies. These
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academic and literary interests, these authors followed the diagnostic case
study formula that gained popularity as both a literary and a scientific
genre toward the late nineteenth century. Of Leopold, the "genius" of the
pair whose fascination with Nietzschean ideas16 inspired him to play slave
to Loeb's putative superman, they wrote:
It is clear that we have here a lad of high intellectual capacity, but
with a strong inferiority complex. There are, obviously, marked
homosexual traits, with masochistic tendencies, and feminine
fantasies are apparent. Such fantasies, in which the subject pictures
himself as a woman, are much more common than is generally
known. Leopold may certainly be regarded as a psychopathic
personality.77
This diagnosis pursued a kind of Freudian formula upon which many
psychoanalytic psychiatrists relied: his "high intellectual capacity," a
quality that would have featured prominently in a nineteenth-century
psychiatric evaluation, here recedes before aspects of sexuality and gender
as manifested in Leopold's fantasy life.78 Further demonstrating an
eminently twentieth-century perspective, they claimed:
"in these cases we always get some sex bond between the parties,
either some actual sex connection, or the joint possession of some sex
secret. This was borne out here. The two had been concerned in some
mutual sex perversions, either on four occasions, or as seems more
likely, of four different varieties."79
At the center of the psychopathy that led to such an otherwise
inexplicable crime was a factor that exceeded the old analysis of insanity
and reason-sex: "Even Freud's opponents will, we think, be disposed to
admit that the complex, in such a case as this, will be found to be of a sex
character. 80
The homoerotic element of this "complex" or "bond" between Leopold
and Loeb did not escape notice on this side of the Atlantic. Walter
daydreams, which have persisted continuously and with great vividness up to the present, have been
indulged in to a tremendous extent and variety ...." Doctors White, et al., Joint Medical Report,
reproduced in MCKERNAN, supra note 66 at 112. They continued that the psychological danger of
such extensive "intrusion of this kind of abnormal imaginative life ... is very great, since it has the
power of eventually leading to the confusion of reality with unreality-as was the case here."
76. His apparent susceptibility to Nietzsche's philosophy became an important element of his
defense strategy: such early exposure to Nietzsche on the part of a fanciful and impressionable boy
was more than likely to augment any incipient mental abnormalities. This association of Nietzschean
ideas with madness and consequent criminality had a venerable history by the 1920s. Sander Gilman
describes a turn-of-the-century German murder trial in which Nietzschean philosophy ostensibly
incited nihilism and misogyny in the law-student defendant accused of killing his girlfriend. SANDER
L. GILMAN, DIFFERENCE AND PATHOLOGY 61-66 (1985).
77. Smith & Fairweather, supra note 66, at 85.
78. Id.
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Bromberg, an influential American psychiatrist who combined a scholarly
treatment of psychiatric history with autobiographical reminiscences of his
own career, wrote in Psychiatry Between the Wars: "I remember that
during my second medical year at the University of Cincinnati rumors
trickled down from Chicago that homosexuality and crime bore a shadowy
relationship to each other."8I This sexual aspect, however, did not emerge
explicitly in most contemporaneous American appraisals of the case,
which generally confined themselves to intimations of "perversion" and
unnatural rituals, all in the service of demonstrating the defendants'
"abnormality." According to historian Paula Fass, who documents the
shifting meanings of the trial in the context of American culture more
generally, media representations of the case employed innuendo, rather
than explicit description, to convey the putatively homoerotic nature of
Leopold and Loeb's relationship.82 Still, a general understanding of its
erotic contours sexualized both the crime and its incitement for a closely
watching public.
Bromberg's recollection about the apparent connection between
homosexuality and crime as it emerged from this case dramatizes two
features of American medico-legal thought in its post-World War I
incarnations: an increased interest in homosexuality generally and the
apparent centrality of sex to crime. This relationship between sex and
crime extended beyond actual "sex crimes." Rather, it encompassed
potentially all crime, for which sex instincts, perversions, desires,
"complexes," and above all early psychosexual development, had become
essential contributors.83 Indeed by the 1930s, "[s]exuality and psychology
began to dominate the public memories and representations" of the
Leopold and Loeb case.84 For instance, when in 1936 a fellow prisoner
murdered Loeb in prison, many commentators attributed his demise to
persistent sexual advances on the murdering inmate, a theory for which
there appears to have been little corroboration.
In the end, the judge agreed with the defense that "the boys," as their
lawyers referred to them throughout the case, should be spared death
based upon their psychological conditions.85 It is unclear, though, to what
extent the experts succeeded in persuading him of the defendants' mental
disturbances and to what extent the nature of the crime-whose sole
motive was its commission-offered psychopathy as its only explanation.
81. BROMBERG, supra note 59, at 103.
82. See Fass, supra note 67, at 940-941.
83. Stephen Robertson's Separating the Men from the Boys: Masculinity, Psychosexual
Development, and Sex Crime in the United States, 1930s-1960s, 56 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED So. 3
(2001), argues persuasively that the psychoanalytic concept of psychosexual development and its
dangerous misdirections proved central to the evolving discourse on psychopathy.
84. Id. at 942.
85. See Howe, supra note 65, at 1036.
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While influenced by their youth, the judge was also "obliged to dwell
upon the mass of data produced as to the physical, mental and moral
condition of the two. They had been shown to be abnormal in essential
respects. Had they been normal they would not, he said, have committed
the crime. 86 Certainly his reasoning in deeming the defendants abnormal
evinced a departure from a world view in which crime was the product of
a wicked and therefore culpable will, a view that accepted diminished
culpability only if its perpetrator could not distinguish right from wrong.
Throughout the trial, Darrow's team had argued that what marked these
young men as abnormal was their total lack of remorse for the crime and
the striking absence of what one psychiatric report termed "appropriate
emotional response" with respect to this and other matters. 87 These factors
seemed symptomatic of the kind of moral disturbance psychopathy
represented, but not of proper legal insanity.
Above all, this case brought the new, psychiatric paradigm closer to the
mainstream of American society: one focused on unconscious processes
rather than on cognition, one clearly indebted to psychoanalytic thought.
In addition, the case left those in the psychiatric community optimistic
about their profession's role in assisting the adjudication of cases
involving potentially disturbed defendants.88 The individual diagnosis and
life-history approach was beginning to prevail among psychiatrists, who
maintained that this, rather than an ability to determine legal insanity, was
the signal achievement of their profession. Yet this attention to the
individual was precisely what rendered psychiatric and legal concerns
potentially incommensurable.
III. PSYCHIATRY TO THE RESCUE!
Psychiatry purported to offer law a novel understanding of human
behavior and its determinants, one bearing the promise of scientific
precision and efficacy. In what follows, I describe the increasingly warm
reception psychiatric insights garnered in legal culture and contemplate
the starring role for the psychopath in the new era of medico-legal
regulation.
86. Smith & Fairweather, supra note 66, at 91.
87. Doctors Hulbert & Bowman, Medical Report, reproduced in MCKERNAN, supra note 66, at
81. See generally Martha Grace Duncan, "So Young and So Untender ": Remorseless Children and
the Expectations of the Law, 102 COLUiM. L. REV. 1469 (2002).
88. In the words of Sheldon Glueck, responding to criticism of some of the defense experts'
techniques: "At the present stage of development of psychology and psychiatry, the best possible
instrumentality at the command of the legal order.., is a thorough psychological, neurological, and
psychiatric examination along the lines employed by the defense experts in the Leopold-Loeb
hearing." GLUECK, supra note 40, at 467.
[20:163
24
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol20/iss2/3
Schmeiser
A. Psychiatry and the criminal mind
Following Leopold and Loeb, psychiatric professionals were poised to
exercise considerable influence in legal matters. A spate of highly
publicized sex crimes in the early 1930s, many involving children,
galvanized politicians and others to call for measures beyond extant laws
to address the newly dramatized problem of the "sex criminal." 9 The
invention of the "sexual psychopath" as a category of person constituted,
to a large extent, an attempt on the part of psychiatrists to occupy an entire
field of legal regulation (one they deemed generally too complex for
lawyers): that of "deviant" sexual behavior. It also accomplished, for
some time at least, the identification of a whole class of people who
required psychiatric intervention and who were poorly served by a legal
system that understood only their bad acts and not their ill minds. Before I
discuss this process in more detail, though, I want to provide a sketch of
the tensions and prospects of overlap that existed between the two
disciplines in the period on which I will be focusing.
Just as the Leopold and Loeb trial was contributing to a new
prominence for psychiatric expertise in criminal matters, if also
illuminating the dissension within the psychiatric community, eminent
members of the legal community advocated increased recognition for
psychiatric insights on the part of those interested in the criminal law. For
example, Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard Law School wrote: "We know
that criminals must be classified as well as crimes. We know that the old
analysis of act and intent can stand only as an artificial legal analysis and
that the mental element in crime presents a series of difficult problems."90
In his separation of criminal from crime, Pound captured the quintessential
division between the two disciplines as they endeavored to reckon with
transgressions of the social and legal orders. Whereas the law had
concentrated almost exclusively on the nature of the offense, and only on
the offender herself insofar as it was necessary to determine the requisite
mens rea, psychiatry illuminated the mind of the criminal-from her
mental capacities to the unconscious emotional forces driving her
behavior. Within this latter framework, locating intent was no longer such
a straightforward business. The elaborate classificatory system in which
intent to commit a crime contributed to the definition of the crime itself
began to seem less relevant as the conscious mind faded in importance
89. See Freedman, supra note 16, at 91. Denno contests the centrality of media reports that
sensationalized sex crimes in contributing to the enactment of sexual psychopath legislation,
specifically disagreeing with Freedman's emphasis on so-called "sex-crime panics." See Denno,
supra note 16, at 1355-66.
90. Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice in the American City--A Summary, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
CLEVELAND 559, 586-87 (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922); see also Thomas A. Green,
Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in the Age of Pound: An Essay on Criminal Justice, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 1915, 1998 (1995).
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compared to the unconscious, to emotions, and to various developmental
factors. With a certain prescience Pound heralded the revolutionary
effects of the new psychological understandings of human behavior:
Within a generation psychology has risen to a practical science of the
first importance, with far-reaching applications on every side.
Psychopathology has overturned much that the criminal law of the
past had built upon. Indeed, the fundamental theory of our orthodox
criminal law has gone down before modem psychology and
psychopathology. The results are only beginning to be felt.91
In his account of the two disciplines, psychopathology, or the study of
mental illness beyond traditional categories of sanity and insanity, posed a
momentous challenge to the "orthodox criminal law," one that was sure to
have resounding consequences.
Justice Benjamin Cardozo also saw room for psychiatric and
psychological intervention in areas of criminal law that were beginning to
seem hopelessly antiquated and myopic in the face of recent medical
claims about human personality and behavior. He expressed particular
concern about the patent inadequacy of the insanity defense as it operated
in most jurisdictions. In a nod toward the increasing legitimacy of
psychiatric discourses and a call for more collaboration between legal and
psychiatric professionals to reformulate this category in keeping with
recent scientific developments, Justice Cardozo announced in a 1928
address before the New York Academy of Medicine that members of the
legal community must rethink the question of criminal responsibility in
partnership with their psychiatric counterparts.
Of this at least I am persuaded: the medical profession of the state,
the students of the life of the mind in health and in disease, should
combine with students of the law in a scientific and deliberate effort
to frame a definition, and a system of administration that will
combine efficiency with truth. If insanity is not to be a defense, let us
say so frankly and even brutally, but let us not mock ourselves with a
definition that palters with reality. Such a method is neither good
morals nor good science nor good law. 9
2
Although Cardozo specifically addressed the problem of adjudicating
criminal insanity, his call for a joint effort between the two disciplines
found other areas of application, particularly in matters affecting
juveniles.93
91. Pound, supra note 90, at 588.
92. Manfred S. Guttmacher, Psychiatry and the Courts, 3 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 161, 165
(1933) (quoting Justice Benjamin Cardozo, Address Before the New York Academy of Medicine
(1928)).
93. Indeed, the years preceding Cardozo's address already had witnessed a significant growth in
the number of psychiatric clinics attached to criminal courts, both among newly instituted juvenile
courts and among adult courts. See generally Adler, supra note 53, at 51-53. For example, when in
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Psychiatry's most striking contribution to the legal treatment of
criminals derived from its primary focus on the individual offender and his
or her psychic condition. This individualized approach to understanding
criminality, however, one that was captured in the oft-repeated mantra
"[t]reat the criminal rather than the crime,"94 also marked psychiatry's
seemingly insurmountable difference from law. As interwar psychiatrist
Manfred Guttmacher remarked in 1932, "[o]ne of the fundamental
conflicts between modem psychiatry and the law is that psychiatry deals
with personalities and as such it is necessarily individualistic. Law, on the
other hand, deals with generalizations. Psychiatry analyzes humanity into
its amorphous elements; law synthesizes into complex, stereotyped,
organic compounds. 95  This disparagement of law's "stereotyping"
function, its reliance on general categories seemingly oblivious to the
specificity of individual psyches, reverberated throughout many
psychiatric commentaries during this period.96 Where in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries lawmakers and judges might have derided
psychiatry for its overly permissive attitude toward human failings, an
attitude that largely informed receptions of the irresistible impulse
approach to legal insanity, by the 1930s psychiatrists expressed
disapproval of-and even thinly veiled contempt for-a legal process that
demonstrated little understanding of the factors animating human
behavior.97
These psychiatrists viewed their own intervention as the sole means of
renewing an outdated and inhumane legal system. Guttmacher concluded
his 1932 address before the National Probation Association by asserting:
1909 Dr. Healy's Psychiatric Clinic was founded in connection with the Juvenile Court of Chicago,
that clinic constituted the first organization of its kind. Yet according to one survey, by 1928
approximately one third of the juvenile courts and ten percent of adult criminal courts boasted official
psychiatric involvement, whether through clinics or through court psychiatrists. Guttmacher, supra
note 92, at 164. In the words of Manfred Guttmacher, an interwar psychiatrist, "[c]ompared with the
centuries since individual factors were first feebly recognized, this is indeed a phenomenal growth in
less than two decades." Id. Bromberg located another shift in the early 1930s when what he calls "[t]he
polite coolness between the two disciplines" which had prevailed for almost a century "began to
thaw .... BROMBERG, supra note 59, at 105.
94. Guttmacher, supra note 92, at 162.
95. Id. at 161.
96. See generally, GLUECK, supra note 40; GEORGE W. JACOBY, THE UNSOUND MIND AND THE
LAW (1918). A small sampling of articles advocating psychiatric involvement in criminal processes as
a means to individualize an otherwise mechanistic system includes: Clara Bassett, Mental Hygiene and
Law, 22 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 819, 832 (1932); V. C. Branham, The Reconciliation of the Legal
and Psychiatric Viewpoints of Delinquency, 17 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 173, 179
(1926); Sheldon Glueck, Psychiatry and the Criminal Law, 14 VA. L. REV. 155, 156 (1928). Basset
decried the inattention to psychiatry and other human sciences in legal education, deeming it
"fantastic to find that the huge, intricate superstructure of the law should receive exclusive attention in
training, when the only importance of the law is in relation to individuals or groups of human beings.
It would seem indubitably clear that at least an equal consideration should be given in the training of
lawyers to the scientific understanding of the human material to which law is applied." Bassett, supra,
at 832.
97. One psychiatrist described the rift as an "ideological struggle" that entailed "mutual suspicion
and even open hostility." Zilboorg, supra note 26, at 543.
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"I see the opportunity of liberalizing and modernizing the attitudes of the
law through the vehicle of psychiatry."98 Another advocate of psychiatric
jurisprudence in the area of criminal law insisted at the 1934 meeting of
the New York Neurological Society's section on neurology and psychiatry
that "the only hopeful approach to the problem of criminal conduct lies in
the application of scientific individualized [treatment] ... in place of...
the mechanical procedure that characterizes the legal approach."99 The
language of these assertions partook of the logic of progress and
enlightenment: psychiatry liberalizes and modernizes; science replaces
mechanistic simplicity with individualized complexity. In these remarks
science and medicine supported democratic liberalism by illuminating the
individual, whereas law subsumed individuality under rigid categorization.
A striking articulation of this logic appeared in Dr. Gregory Zilboorg's
1939 article "Misconceptions of Legal Insanity":
Let me repeat: the issue is fundamentally not between the basic intent
of the law and psychiatry, but between a revengeful, suspicious and
instinctive hatred of the criminal which is more unconscious than
conscious on the part of society on the one hand and science on the
other; between a tradition of superstition whether it is couched in
terms of the fifteenth or the twentieth century and enlightenment;
between the centuries old doctrine of free will (a basic human
megalomanic superstition) and that scientific humility which knows
that man is human.' 00
Zilboorg here performed a brilliant rhetorical maneuver, whereby the
law came to stand for irrationality in the form of revenge, suspicion,
hatred, and superstition, incapable even of cognition, but rather subject to
instinct and unconscious forces. Science, on the other hand, a counterpart
to psychiatry, came to stand for enlightenment and humility.
Above all, psychiatrists objected to the persistent legal adherence to an
ideology of free will, which became in Zilboorg's account "a basic
megalomanic superstition." For the discoveries of modern psychiatric
inquiry, particularly those of psychoanalysis but also theories of
endocrinology, neurology, and others that together made up the
psychiatric canon, had accomplished nothing if not a thorough debunking
of this belief. Zilboorg wrote derisively and emphatically about the
general attachment to this fiction of free will, linking it to the fifteenth-
98. Guttmacher, supra note 92, at 174.
99. Proceedings of the New York Neurological Society, Psychiatry and the Criminal Law, 82 J.
NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 192, 192 (1935). Instead of the "battle of the experts" that took place
in criminal trials where a defendant's mental condition was at issue, one commentator advocated the
universal adoption of procedures for committing all such defendants to psychiatric hospitals for
evaluation before trial, thereby obviating the need to try those who warranted long-term commitment
rather than punishment. See Harry Weihofen, An Alternative to the Battle of the Experts: Hospital
Examination of Criminal Defendants Before Trial, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 419 (1935).
100. Zilboorg, supra note 26, at 549.
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and sixteenth-century notion that mental disease signaled a person's
willing submission to the devil: "It is less obvious today, less blatant, less
destructive; it has lost the attributes of the mass psychosis which held
sway for almost three centuries, but the inner fear of mental disease, the
inner hatred of the criminal, the megalomanic conviction that our will is
free and that man is full master of his own fate remain almost unchanged
except in advanced quarters of psychiatry."'' Here Zilboorg again
fashioned a distinction between the primitive, even psychotic, idea that
"man is full master of his own fate," an idea intimately tied to fear and
hatred, and the enlightened thought confined to "advanced quarters of
psychiatry." Not only was it up to the psychiatric elite to educate the rest
of the world about the fallacy of their most cherished beliefs, but to the
extent these beliefs represented psychosis (perhaps were even products of
sick minds), only a man or woman trained in the sciences of the mind
could diagnosis their maladaptive origins.'0 2
B. The rise of the psychopath
While psychiatrists gathered clinical data through a process that
elevated biography to the status of core evidence, wherein everything in
the subject's life from her genetic legacy to her family dynamics to her
sexual fantasies became fodder for diagnosis, they also operated, by
necessity, in impersonal diagnostic categories. When taken up by the
legal system, these categories took on a rigidity that fixed individual
subjects into identity categories to which severe regulatory consequences
attached, a process that emerges starkly in the case of the sexual
psychopath. Although the figure of the psychopath made his European
debut in the nineteenth century as a kind of corollary to the insane, but one
who suffered solely from moral or volitional insanity rather than from
cognitive insanity, he did not gain prominence in American psychiatric
discourse until the 1920s and 1930s.10 3  Late nineteenth-century
101. Id. at 547.
102. By the 1950s, some psychiatrists had shifted their emphasis away from this dismantling of
free will precisely because of the enormous social and legal investment in its integrity. For instance,
in his 1953 volume The Psychiatrist and the Law, Dr. Winfred Overhoser maintained that the
deterministic aspect of psychiatric insights did not contravene the core tenet of free will. WINFRED
OVERHOSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW 20-21 (1953). Overhoser was the superintendent of
St. Elizabeth's Hospital and former president of the American Psychiatric Association; he also
functioned as one of the primary psychiatrists in charge of diagnosing homosexuality and other mental
disorders for the United States Military during World War II.
103. See Freedman, supra note 18, at 87. With the first edition of the American Psychiatric
Association's DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-1) in 1952, the
psychopath finally retired, at least for technical diagnostic purposes, in favor of the "sociopath." The
DSM labeled the disorder "sociopathic personality disturbance, antisocial reaction," referring to
"chronically antisocial individuals who are always in trouble, profiting neither from experience nor
punishment, and maintaining no real loyalties to any person, group or code. They are frequently
callous and hedonistic, showing marked emotional immaturity, with lack of responsibility, lack of
judgment, and an ability to rationalize their behavior so that it appears warranted, reasonable, and
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understandings of sexual deviance as exemplified by Krafft-Ebing's
Psychopathia Sexualis contrasted "perversity" (moral weakness, culpable
for its failures, ultimately volitional) to "perversion," a compulsive,
congenital anomaly that exempted its sufferer from responsibility.1"4
Indeed, Krafft-Ebing approached the issue of sexual deviance from a
background in forensic medicine and began his work in this area with the
intention of separating crime from disease.10 5  Twentieth-century
elaborations of the psychopath borrowed the terms of this sexual
taxonomy to construct their object of inquiry, a person whose strange
proclivities extended beyond the sexual realm.1" 6 By reinvigorating the
old notion of moral or volitional insanity, but refashioning it away from
the fraught category of the insane, forensic psychiatrists created a new
category of person: a morally diseased subject whose pathology lay in his
compromised will.
By his very definition, then, the psychopath presented a legal, as well as
a medical, conundrum.10 7 Early appearances of this figure coincided with
a general trend away from the strict binary opposition sane/insane (and
concomitantly a broadening of the psychiatric purview to cover a wider
justified." AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 38 (1st ed. 1952). Since that shift "sociopathic personality" has in turn given
way to "antisocial personality disorder." Recent work in forensic psychology and criminology,
however, has firmly resurrected the psychopath as a type of particularly dangerous criminal not
susceptible to rehabilitation. See, e.g., Charles Fischette, Psychopathy and Responsibility, 90 VA. L.
REV. 1423 (2004); Grant T. Harris et al., The Construct of Psychopathy, 28 CRIME & JUST. 197
(2001); Grant T. Harris et al., Psychopathy and Violent Recidivism, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 625
(1991); Robert D. Hare et al., Psychopathy and the DSM-IV Criteria for Antisocial Personality
Disorder, 100 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 391 (1991).
104. The title of Krafft-Ebing's book derived from an 1843 work by a Russian physician,
Heinrich Kaan, who envisioned sexual perversion as a variety of moral insanity. See DEAN, supra
note 63, at 19. Krafft-Ebing made this distinction between vice and biology emphatically, for non-
normative sexual acts remained the province of law and morality, whereas his focus-diseases of the
sexual instinct, perversion-properly fell under medical jurisdiction.
Perversion of the sexual instinct.., is not to be confounded with perversity in the sexual act;
since the latter may be induced by conditions other than psychopathological. The concrete
perverse act, monstrous as it may be, is clinically not decisive. In order to differentiate between
disease (perversion) and vice (perversity), one must investigate the whole personality of the
individual and the original motive leading to the perverse act. Therein will be found the key to
the diagnosis.
KRAFFT-EBING, supra note 56, at 53. For instance, he took pains to distinguish the two categories in
his discussion of homosexuality: "The determining factor here is the demonstration of perverse feeling
for the same sex; not the proof of sexual acts with the same sex. These two phenomena must not be
confounded with each other; perversity must not be taken for perversion." Id. at 247 (emphasis in
original).
105. See Harry Oosterhaus, Richard von Krafft-Ebing's 'Step-Children of Nature': Psychiatry
and the Making of a Homosexual Identity, in SCIENCE AND HOMOSEXUALITIES 67, 70 & 78 (Vernon
A. Rosario ed., 1997).
106. With the advent of psychoanalytic models, however, these impulse "disorders" (in Glueck's
words) never strayed far from their psycho-sexual origins. See, e.g., GLUECK, supra note 40, at 304.
107. In Glueck's MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW, the entry on "Legal Significance
of the Psychopathoses" contends: "It is around these types of constitutionally psychopathic offenders
that the arguments between physicians and lawyers have largely centered. They constitute to a large
extent the so called partially insane which the law does not exempt from responsibility." Id. at 382.
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spectrum of maladies, as discussed above). For example, the 1918 treatise
The Unsound Mind and the Law contained a chapter on "Psychopathic
Disposition" where the author suggested that psychopathy might prove an
unstable concept. He made the provocative claim that "[t]he notion of
sickness, whether in the physical or psychic domain, cannot be strictly
circumscribed and the boundary line between health and disease is always
inconstant."' 8  His assertion took the subject of psychopathy as an
occasion to blur the boundaries between the normal and the
pathological. 109
When leading medical figures envisioned psychopathy as a kind of
intermediate state between "normality" and legal insanity, they
simultaneously conceived of its subject, the psychopath, as the
quintessential criminal: cunning, canny, and amoral." 0  Benjamin
Karpman organized an entire symposium on psychopathy at St.
Elizabeth's hospital, where he practiced psychiatry in 1923; the
proceedings made their way into the Journal of Mental Hygiene the
following year. There Karpman wrote: "In the psychopaths we have
unstable individuals with marked volitional and temperamental, but not
obviously intellectual defects, who are the criminals par excellence, their
criminality resulting from psychopathic difficulties and maladjustments
which eventually bring them into conflict with the law.""' Then and in
the decades that followed, Karpman and others emphasized the
significance of psychopathy as an aspect of criminality that could not find
adequate treatment in the traditional criminal law." 2 What ensued was at
its extreme a movement to develop a whole separate field of
psychopathology apart from conventional psychiatry, and in its more
moderate form a new confidence in the diagnostic and classificatory utility
of the category "psychopath."
By 1939, an entire periodical devoted to the study of psychopathy in its
relationship to crime emerged: the Journal of Criminal Psychopathology.
108. GEORGE W. JACOBY, THE UNSOUND MIND AND THE LAW: A PRESENTATION OF FORENSIC
PSYCHIATRY 43 (1918).
109. Similarly, in a move avowedly informed by evolving psychoanalytic thought, another writer
extended this observation to the notion of insanity itself in his 1924 volume Insanity and the Criminal
Law, contending that the difference between sanity and insanity was a matter of degree rather than
kind. See JOHN C. GOODWIN, INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 98 (1924).
110. According to Glueck, "studies in recidivism have shown again and again that these offenders
[the psychopaths] contribute heavily to the criminal and dependent classes, and that the apparently
constitutional nature of their mental and behavioral anomalies make the ordinary penal or reformatory
measures largely abortive." GLUECK, supra note 40, at 382. In his textbook on criminology,
sociologist Edwin Sutherland critiqued this association as essentially tautological: criminals were
psychopathic, and psychopathy was defined by criminal tendencies. See EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND,
CRIMINOLOGY 123 (1924).
111. The Psychopathic Individual: A Symposium, 8 MENTAL HYGIENE, 174, 199 (1924).
112. See generally Karl Birnbaum, The Social Significance of the Psychopathic, 149 ANNALS
AMER. ACAD. POLIT. & SOC. SCIENCE 70 (1930); James J. Graham, What to Do With the Psychopath?
53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POL. SCI. 446 (1962); Harry R. Lipton, The Psychopath, 40 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 584 (1950).
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In its first volume, Karpman set out the method and object of criminal
psychopathology as it differed from other disciplines, including
conventional psychiatry. In keeping with the broader psychiatric field,
Karpman stressed the extent to which, unlike other disciplines equally
interested in criminality such as criminology and academic psychology
that tended to study aggregates and general trends, "Criminal
Psychopatholgy must perforce emphasize the individual aspect.""' 3
Calling its relationship to these other disciplines "missionary," Karpman
listed the aspects of Criminal Psychopathology from which the others
stood to learn:
its emphasis on the individual and not on the mass, on the doer and
not on the deed, on basic motives rather than explanations and
rationalizations, an appreciation of the role of emotions in our life,
especially at the unconscious level, as basic etiological factors in the
productions of crime, and as corollaries to these, an entirely different
approach to the problem of right and wrong, guilt and innocence, of
responsibility, of confinement and punishment, etc.'
Its divergence from psychiatry was more complicated, however, for
psychiatry had defined itself successfully as a discipline through its
individualized focus. Nonetheless, Karpman wrote contemptuously of
conventional psychiatry despite its interest in the individual, suggesting
that many psychiatrists had succumbed to legal reasoning, "see[ing] the
criminal eye to eye with the lawyer," testifying at criminal trials "that this
or that man knew the nature of the act or knew the difference between
right and wrong, when a little reflection would show that merely knowing
the nature of the act intellectually does not at all mean that the individual
absorbed it emotionally ... .""' Criminal Psychopathology, on the other
hand, took in Karpman's account a much more enlightened view,
influenced by developments in psychoanalysis: that a person's behavior
was largely the product of unconscious motivations.' 16 In other words, he
suggested, if the unconscious rules our mental lives and dictates much of
our conduct, then social regulation predicated on the assumption of human
agency and freedom is doomed to failure. This observation held true for
criminals and noncriminals alike since, as Karpman reasoned, if neuroses
were but antisocial impulses repressed by the exigencies of culture, then
criminality could be understood as the "overflow of instinctive energy into
113. Ben Karpman, The Principles and Aims of Criminal Psychopathology, I J. CRIM.
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 187, 189 (1939). Indeed, by many accounts Karpman's career was increasingly
defined by his preoccupation with the psychopath and his insistent attempts to legitimate the study and
treatment of this figure. The journal enjoyed only a brief existence: five volumes published between
July 1939 and April 1944. Its publisher, the Medical Press, then issued the periodical for another year
under the significantly altered title, Journal of Clinical Psychopathology and Psychotherapy.
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socially prohibited channels.""' 7
With the inauguration of Criminal Psychopathology as a separate field
of inquiry with its own methodology, Karpman hoped to effect a
transformation in the legal treatment of crime and criminals. If, as ie
claimed, this new field "denie[d] that the criminal is a responsible
agent,""' 8 then traditional legal measures for dealing with criminals and
the rationales of retribution and deterrence commonly marshaled to justify
these measures all required reformulation. Convinced of the necessity for
such a reformulation, Karpman described the pioneering role the
purveyors of this new approach would play:
The criminal psychopathologist [unlike the forensic psychiatrist],
convinced that criminality, being an unconsciously conditioned
reaction, and therefore but a symptom of a disease over which the
individual has no control, will go to court and testify in cases of rape,
bigamy, pyromania, etc., that the individual is mentally sick, that
though he may intellectually know the difference between right and
wrong, he is unable to choose so emotionally, that he is therefore not
guilty by reason of such a disease, that punishment will be of no
avail, for the etiology keeps on operating after the sentence is over
and that his place is not in a prison but in a psychiatric institution,
and that what he needs is not a sentence, but an indefinite period of
confinement until he is cured, and that treatment is psychic." 9
Karpman's approach was unlikely to prevail with respect to persons
convicted of most crimes for which the probable motives-avarice,
vengeance, hatred, even necessity-seemed both comprehensible and
deserving of censure; therefore, the public and lawmakers preferred as a
general rule to conceive of these offenders as bad rather than mad. But his
perspective by 1940 had already exercised notable influence in the realm
of sex offenders, as Karpman well knew, being a vociferous champion of
research into the so-called sexual psychopath.
C. Psychopathology and the sex offender
Although in this introduction to the field of criminal psychopathology
Karpman did not launch into a full-scale discussion of sexuality and
psychopathy, a subject that would later preoccupy him in such works as
The Sexual Offender and His Offenses (1954), he indicated that
homosexuality in particular plays a significant role in the production of
crime and predicted that further research would yield evidence to this
effect. '2 Historians have linked the psychiatric interest in sex criminals
117. Id. at 194.
118. Id. at 207.
119. Id. at 215.
120. Id. at 201. In a slightly later article, Karpman focused on several case studies where the
criminality at issue was, as he put it, "an expression of psychosexual infantilism." Ben Karpman,
2008]
33
Schmeiser: The Ungovernable Citizen
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2008
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
and the relationship between sexuality and psychopathic personality to
two intellectual currents: European sexology, popularized in the 1920s and
1930s in the United States and its American progeny of sex research (such
as the work of William Masters and Virginia Johnson 121); and
psychoanalysis, specifically Freudian concepts of psychosexual
development. 12' Both propounded a view of sexuality and sexual
knowledge as integral to the self and to a robust social body. By the
fourth decade of the twentieth century, it was sexual repression rather than
its excess that seemed to pose the greatest danger.
23
For example, the title of a volume called Social Control of Sex
Expression, published in 1931, conveyed a "modem" sexual ideology.
124
In a departure from dominant Victorian mores of chastity, masculine
restraint, and feminine passionlessness, its author suggested that sex
would manifest itself through "expression" were it not for various means
and areas of "social control." His book concluded that, "[e]ven where the
legal control of sexual activity has been most effective, the stifled
impulses have persisted and emerged in other forms. That the emergence
was unconscious was none the less dangerous."' 25 Law as artifice stifled
natural "impulses"; yet these forceful impulses found escape through
alternative, and more dangerous, venues-not infrequently crime. Later in
the same decade, while a nationwide panic about sex crimes was in
progress, 2 6 a psychiatrist contended that the puritanical attitudes toward
sexuality prevailing in American culture posed the greatest obstacle to the
goal of eliminating these offenses.
It would be too much to expect anything like a solution of the
Criminality as an Expression of Psychosexual Infantilism, 3 J. CRIM. PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 383 (1942).
Providing fodder for the argument that psychiatry had something unique and essential to offer to the
regulation of criminality, he concluded that "[i]n cases of this type, criminality is an expression of a
specific type of neurosis distinctly approachable by psychotherapeutic means." Id. at 429.
121. See JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 312 (1988).
122. See Freedman, supra note 18, at 90; Robertson, supra note 83.
123. Even in the years leading up to the First World War, prominent medical authorities and
others were beginning to construe sexuality as a wholesome and beautiful force; only the embrace of
this force, rather than its repression, could forestall degradation and perversion. See DEAN, supra note
63, at 55. But the development of the social sciences and their "experts" between the wars brought the
dangers of sexual repression into the public eye. What passed as sexual "morality," according to one
1925 critique, actually amounted to "barbarity and imbecility in regard to the handling of sex question
in present day society," a combination responsible for most of our social and individual pathologies.
Harry Elmer Barnes, Sociology and Ethics: A Genetic View of the Theory of Conduct, 3 J. Soc.
FORCES 212, 216 (1925). A repressive approach had given rise to "a veritable sexual obsession on the
part of the American population." Id. at 218.
124. See GEOFFREY MAY, SOCIAL CONTROL OF SEX EXPRESSION (1931).
125. Id. at 275.
126. See Freedman, supra note 18, at 92. Denno, on the other hand, conducts a statistical analysis
of the relationship among media coverage of sex crimes, media coverage of other crimes, enactment of
sexual psychopath legislation, and FBI data on annual crime rates to challenge Freedman's historical
account of a sex-crime panic and of the media's role in fueling the legislative response to sexual
offenses. See Denno, supra note 18, at 1355-1366.
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problem of sex offenses and sex offenders in a society which still
provides inadequately for the inculcation of normal sex habits in its
individual members, still often deliberately undertakes to obscure and
befuddle the problem for the young or frequently denies opportunities
for the practice of normal sexuality in maturity. Sex perversions are
usually sex preferences, at least for want of a better, and cannot be
eliminated by mere statutory regulations.127
Like so many of his fellow doctors, this author recommended, among
other things, that scientists be enlisted in the project of revising statutes
related to sexual behavior. In addition, he advocated in a familiar refrain
giving wider discretion to courts "so that the punishment or disposition of
the case can be made to fit the criminal rather than the crime."'128
These recommendations coincided with a national fervor about sex
crimes, which, according to historian Estelle Freedman, lasted from about
1937 to 1940; another such panic took place from 1949 to 1955.129 In
1937, FBI director J. Edgar Hoover began an article in the New York
Herald Tribune entitled "War on the Sex Criminal" with the following
battle cry: "The sex fiend, most loathsome of all the vast army of crime,
has become a sinister threat to the safety of American childhood and
womanhood."1 30 Historians have since confirmed that no significant
increase in the incidence of sex-related crime occasioned this heightened
awareness,131 and professionals in the field of criminology appear to have
maintained as much at the time (and to have convinced their psychiatric
counterparts of the fallacy driving the national response to certain highly
publicized cases). 32 Nevertheless, politicians and others began to
perceive the need for a novel approach to the legal treatment of sex
127. Joseph Wortis, Sex Taboos, Sex Offenders and the Law, 9 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 554,
563 (1939).
128. Id.
129. See Freedman, supra note 18, at 92. Although Denno contests Freedman's emphasis on these
sex-crime panics, many of the sources I consulted that were published during this period support the
account of heightened and inflammatory national attention to sex crimes. For example, one law
review article published in 1955 claimed that, in addition to the calls for scientific enlightenment, "an
even more important factor in the enactment of such legislation was the ever-growing preoccupation
of powerful and vociferous parts of the population with sex crimes," giving rise to demands for action
expressed with "hysterical fervor." Frederick J. Hacker & Marcel Frym, The Sexual Psychopath Act
in Practice: A Critical Discussion, 43 CAL. L.J. 766 (1955). Unlike Denno, I am less interested in the
question of causality (i.e., did a media-fueled sex-crimes panic exist, and, if so, did it cause the turn
toward sexual psychopath legislation?) than I am in the ways in which the rhetoric surrounding the sex
offender constituted this figure as an ungovernable citizen.
130. J. Edgar Hoover, War on the Sex Criminal, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Sept. 26, 1937, quoted in
Jack Frosch & Walter Bromberg, The Sex Offender-A Psychiatric Study, 9 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 761, 761 (1939).
131. Freedman notes that no necessary correlation existed between the periods of panic around
sex crimes and the incidence of violent, sexually related crime. Notwithstanding the lack of statistical
or other evidence to justify the ominous rhetoric, a public inflamed by incendiary accounts of
individual acts of sexual violence demanded a response from the state. See Freedman, supra note 16,
at 92-93.
132. See Frosch & Bromberg, supra note 130, at 761.
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offenders, a category of criminal that was beginning to grip the public
imagination, fueled by inflammatory rhetoric such as Hoover's.
Following a series of "sex-killings," for example, Mayor Fiorello
LaGuardia of New York City initiated a citywide investigation into the
psychiatric status of sexual offenders. He ordered that all men convicted
of and sentenced to prison for indecent exposure, impairing the morals of
a minor, sodomy, or attempted rape be evaluated by a psychiatrist.,33 On
the basis of this evaluation, a magistrate judge decided whether or not to
send convicts upon their release to the psychiatric ward of Bellevue
Hospital for additional observation that might lead to long-term
psychiatric commitment.134 The conclusion of this investigation, however,
yielded the consensus that "the majority of revolting sex crimes are
committed by persons who are not legally insane."' 35 If not the legally
insane, then what sort of person committed these "revolting" crimes? A
feverish discussion about the nature and appropriate treatment of such a
person ensued over the next two decades, precipitating hundreds of books
and articles and a series of laws specifically addressed to the problem,
both legal and psychiatric, of the "criminal sexual psychopath."
Psychiatrists and psychologists took this occasion to augment their own
intervention into what they perceived as an archaic and inhumane criminal
law. One wrote:
Again [as with insanity] science must come to the rescue! The sex
criminal is not possessed of the devil and sending him to the electric
chair or imprisoning him will not cure him nor will it deter others
from becoming sexual psychopaths. Although we do not yet know
too much concerning this complex problem, we do know that the sex
criminal or sexual pervert is suffering from an illness-a distorted
emotional state-and although not as tangible or visible as a broken
arm, yet is just as real.' 36 [Author: check last line of this quote;
missing a word?].
As they did in more general discussions of criminal responsibility,
commentators juxtaposed the penal approach to sex crimes against a
scientific one. Whereas they construed the penal approach as superstitious
and therefore both irrational and ineffective, they took medical science to
promise both enlightenment and efficacy.
If this trope of enlightenment attended critiques of traditional criminal
justice and advocacy of scientific advances in the understanding and
management of human behavior, it also inflected efforts to move away
from Victorian distaste for the public treatment of sexual matters. For
133. Richard A. McGee, Introduction to BERTRAM S. POLLENS, THE SEX CRIMINAL 14 (1938).
McGee was warden at Riker's Island.
134. See id.
135. Wortis, supra note 127, at 554 (citation omitted).
136. POLLENS, THE SEX CRIMINAL, supra note 133, at 25.
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instance, the "open and frank discussion" of sex crimes that took place in
1937-as exemplified by Hoover's sensationalist warning-was, as the
author of a 1938 volume entitled The Sex Criminal asserts, "one more
indication of our gradual emergence from darkness into light.' 37 In the
preface to his 1939 collection Sex and the Statutory Law, subtitled "A
comparative study and survey of the legal and legislative treatment of sex
problems," lawyer Robert Veit Sherwin remarked that
[t]he healthy outlook in regard to the subject of Sex is a thing of the
present, and even more of the future.... Assuming such progress as
having been accomplished, the question now arises: Has the Law in
regard to topics concerning Sex made the same progress? Does the
Court's judgment always coincide with the doctor's prescription?"' 38
Although Sherwin claimed in this preface that his book would merely
present the statutory material without editorial evaluation, the ensuing
pages suggest that the law lagged behind medical and popular discourse
on sex.
Other commentators supported reform of the existing approach to sexual
offenses while pursuing a slightly different logic. One author's analysis
resembled that of Freud's later works such as Civilization and its
Discontents to the extent that it understood prohibition and constraint on
sexual expression as a necessary concomitant of a stable and thriving
culture, at the same time that it declined to offer moral or other normative
justifications for penalizing certain sexual practices and elevating
others."39
It should be clear that if we regard our normal sexuality as good, it must
be socially applauded and encouraged, as indeed it is; and if abnormal
sexuality is bad, it must be socially reproved and discouraged, as
undoubtedly it is. You cannot at the same time applaud, encourage, or
even accept both normal and abnormal sexuality; the social taboos against
abnormal sexuality are essential to the preservation of our normal sexual
tradition. 40
The role of law, for this author, was therefore to codify and reinforce
social taboos, which themselves represented a kind of cultural consensus
rather than some natural or divinely ordained regimen of appropriate
behavior.' 41 Contriving to inform his readers that sexual norms are
137, Id. at 20.
138. Preface to ROBERT VEIT SHERWIN, SEX AND THE STATUTORY LAW (1939).
139. In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud describes love as either "genital" or "aim
inhibited" and asserts that love "on the one hand comes into opposition to the interests of civilization;
on the other, civilization threatens love with substantial restrictions." SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION
AND ITS DISCONTENTS 50 (James Strachey ed. & trans.,1961) (1930).
140. Wortis, supra note 127, at 561-562.
141. See id. at 564. It bears noting that doctors' relativist appreciation of sexual behavior as
culturally and historically diverse did not prevent them from writing of homosexual practices with the
utmost distaste and disparagement. Erin Carlston points to this inconsistency with respect to the
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culturally contingent, he advocated efforts to inculcate these norms as
thoroughly as possible. 142 Each of these authors thus shared in common
with the others, and indeed with the reigning medical discourses of the
time, both an avowed commitment to widespread sexual education and the
conviction that secrecy and reticence in sexual matters contribute to the
creation of sex criminals.
Another aspect of this conviction entailed a more inclusive
understanding of the illness or maladjustment deemed to characterize sex
offenders. According to lawyer and psychologist Bertram Pollens, author
of The Sex Criminal, the problem of sex crime extended beyond the
incidents that reach courts and newspapers. Not only are there people
whose "sexual peculiarities" are confined to their homes, sheltered from
the gaze of the law, but
''we must also add the numerous individuals in whom the sexual
deviation is present in a latent form; those who have not expressed
their pathological tendencies in any overt abnormal sexual behavior
but who have expressed it in the language of the unconscious-
hysteria, neurosis, drug addiction, chronic alcoholism or
psychosis."' 14
3
Indeed, continued Pollens, this comprehensive view enabled us to see
that the problem "reaches down to the home of our best friend and next
door neighbor, and that we may even find it lurking in a comer very close
and proximate to our own hearth-the unknown skeleton in the closet."' 44
Pollens's description here echoed the language of many psychiatrists and
social scientists writing about psychopathy, in both its overtly sexual and
its apparently nonsexual manifestations. 45  Others conveyed the
elusiveness of the sexually "normal" by defamiliarizing, through technical
description, the very sexual conventions upon which Americans relied to
differentiate sanctioned from proscribed behavior. 146 Their efforts to find
continuities between psychopathic persons and those considered "normal,"
and to understand sexual deviance as a widespread, if not desirable,
component of Americans' sexual lives and fantasies, constituted a kind of
function of ancient Greek culture in these writings: while psychiatrists cited Greek sexual practices to
advance the case that homosexual behavior, so reviled in this culture, was celebrated in others, they
described such practices elsewhere in the same work in the most disapprobatory tones. See Erin G.
Carlston, 'A Finer Differentiation': Female Homosexuality & the American Medical Community,
1926-1940, in SCIENCE AND HOMOSEXUALITIES, supra note 105, at 177, 184-185.
142. Wortis, supra note 127, at 555.
143. POLLENS, supra note 133, at 22.
144. Id. at 22-23.
145. See, e.g., Bimbaum, supra note 110, at 71; Lipton, supra note 110, at 585.
146. For example, Wortis wrote that "the sex offender is an adult individual who engages in any
sexual practice (except masturbation) that falls outside the socially acceptable scope of normal
sexuality. And normal sexuality in our culture means heterosexual relations voluntarily and privately
practiced in the normal manner by responsible adults (not too closely related) who are either married
to each other or (possibly) who are not married at all." Wortis, supra note 127, at 555.
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universalizing gesture. This gesture contravened-sometimes
unwittingly--dominant discourses about ridding American society of
perverts and freaks. If its citizens were all potentially perverts and freaks,
then how could a nation effectively combat transgressions of its laws and
social mores?
In addition to broad sex education and a more open discussion of sexual
matters, a general consensus emerged among commentators on the subject
that the solution to sex offenses and their perpetrators lay not in more
punitive regulation of specific acts, but in more extensive and concerted
concentration on the individual offender, or the potential offender. Since
psychiatrists had defined themselves for several decades by their
individualized focus and their ability to illuminate, identify, and
potentially cure maladapted and psychopathic persons through
psychotherapy and careful study, they appeared to offer a more informed
alternative to the existing statutory regime. Members of both the
psychiatric and legal professions called for greater involvement on the part
of doctors and greater deference to their expertise in shaping laws that
would address the so-called illness itself rather than merely its most
destructive symptoms.
But this call for a medicalized approach to sex crimes remained fraught
from the beginning. On the one hand, psychiatric professionals generally
understood sexual illness and maladjustment as a condition affecting a
broad range of people and manifesting itself in a variety of symptoms,
some overt and most others well disguised as more benign-seeming
neuroses. Indeed, the extreme version of this view held that sexual
maladjustment was endemic to the self in the modem age. Yet, on the
other hand, psychiatrists' mandate to focus on the individual offender,
both actual and incipient, rather than on his acts or offenses necessitated a
legal regime that emphasized specific kinds of persons with specific
qualities considered to be manifestations of an illness, and hence not
amenable to conventional penal remedies. As Pollens wrote, "it is not the
act performed which is important, but the motive underlying it. That is the
psychological and scientific approach." '147 This emphasis on classifying
the individual operated according to the very minoritizing logic doctors
warned against in their efforts to soften the boundary separating the
normal and the pathological in sexual and other matters.
D. Toward curing sexual psychopathy
Psychiatrists' initial challenge was to persuade the legal and
criminological communities that a person's acts warranted less attention
than did her psychological makeup. This perspective seemed
147. POLLENS, supra note 133, at 27.
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incompatible with a criminal justice system that operated according to
impersonal categories, apparently inflexible rules, and, most of all,
antiquated notions of responsibility. Pollens argued that the goal of
treatment for sex offenders to cure their disease required a wholly
different legal approach from one that imposed penal sentences for
specific acts according to their perceived severity:
[The laws] should conform with modem, scientific knowledge, and
the old traditional notions of sanity and insanity should be discarded.
A code should be drafted which would provide for the adequate study
of each defendant and the sentence imposed should be for treating
and not punishing him. This would, of course, necessitate taking into
consideration his entire makeup-physical, mental, emotional, as
well as his social environment-and it would necessitate the
establishment of a psychiatric and psychological clinic for each
court. 1
4 8
In Pollens's vision of a modernized legal response to the problem of sex
crimes, the mental health professions became not merely adjuncts to the
legal one, but indeed co-partners in each stage of the legal process.
Doctors and others advanced the cause of reorienting the legal focus
away from particular acts and toward certain identities in the domain of
sex by arguing for the inefficacy of conventional penal remedies, for the
opportunity to prevent future and more gruesome offenses on the part of
past and potential offenders, and for the need to differentiate these
offenders from fellow criminals and noncriminals alike. In the first line of
argument, they claimed that, since sexual offenses were symptoms of an
underlying illness, the appropriate treatment of their actual and likely
perpetrators should take a medical, rather than a penal, form. Their
prevention argument in turn pursued a logic suggesting that, since these
crimes represented symptomatic manifestations of an essential pathology,
the correct approach was to identify and treat the pathology before the
symptoms emerged or escalated. Finally, discussions that began to
conjure up the figure of the sexual psychopath took up the old discourse of
irresistible impulse and made evident its newly sexual predicate.
Ira Wile's 1942 article Sex Offenders and Sex Offenses: Classification
and Treatment represents a paradigmatic instance of the anti-penal
stance. 149  It advanced the principal argument for an individualized,
personality-based rather than acts-based, approach to viewing sexual
offenders, suggesting that, since sexual offenses only offend because of
particular social arrangements and norms, we should not mete out
148. Id. at 18.
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punishment by offense but rather provide treatment for the offenders.15
Wile also generalized the inadequacy of the penal approach in the context
of sex to apply to all human behavior, suggesting that regulation alone
could never reach the myriad factors that contribute to peoples' violations
of the law:
"Society is wont to believe that behavior can be controlled by an
awareness of the consequences of behavior. Our punitive system
proves the doubtfulness of this procedure. Behavior is controlled by
forces more driving than mere social regulation. The individual must
be recognized as the basic factor in whatever he does." '151
Indeed, with this observation he implicitly questioned the very premise
of statutory law. Developments in the behavioral sciences, particularly
those informed by psychoanalysis, pointed toward the inefficacy of law as
a regulatory instrument; transgressive behavior often seemed either
designed precisely to thwart legal prohibition, or governed by an
unconscious logic fairly immune to and ignorant of statutory law.152
Sympathetic legal commentators also contributed to this campaign
against the punitive tradition. In some versions the logic of the cure
retained a rationalist premise, diminishing the challenge psychopathy
posed to free will and reason, while conceding the job to doctors. For
Sherwin, sexual deviants were most properly understood as "patients," in
need of medical treatment to rehabilitate their diminished capacity for self-
restraint.
Formerly a person was either normal or he was a degenerate, if he
were sexually perverted in anyway [sic], and it is now realized that
no magic tonic of any sort will drive the wickedness instilled by the
Evil One out of the victim. Instead, to remove the 'mal' from
maladjustment, an analysis of the ailment, and understanding of the
person who is the patient, and a sufficiency of aid from without will
help to create the necessary strength deep within and thereby
substitute conversion for perversion.' 53
Medicine offered Sherwin both industry and the tools to repair a
weakened will. Recognizing the reality that certain persons suffer from a
pathological condition that severely erodes their reason and their self-
control, that they lack the capacity to adhere to social norms and indeed
150. Wile wrote that "[t]reatment for a symptomatic sex offense should be based upon the
personality needs of the arrested offender. It should not be based primarily upon punitive values
socially assessed upon the offense." Id. at 26.
151. Id.
152. Freud's psychoanalytic theories that supported such frameworks for understanding
transgressive behavior include the diagnosis of "criminality from a sense of guilt" (one among "Some
Character Types Met with in Psycho-analytic Work," the title of a 1916 essay in 14 STANDARD
EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 309, 332-33); see also
Susan R. Schmeiser, Punishing Guilt, 64 AM. IMAGO 317 (2007).
153. Sherwin, supra note 138, at 4-5.
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seem compelled to transgress them, he nonetheless expressed faith that
medicine could restore these qualities.
Since sexually psychopathic persons were allegedly capable of acting
out their psychopathy in a variety of ways ranging from the relatively
harmless to the violent and dangerous, commentators on the subject
emphasized the need for prophylactic measures to ferret out such persons
before they became a menace. Prevention became a crucial goal of which
traditional punitive approaches fell far short, since these largely took
effect after their subjects already had met with trouble. In his introduction
to Pollens' The Sex Criminal, the warden of Rikers Island Penitentiary put
it thus: "If society is to be protected against the sex criminal, the sexually
maladjusted must be identified before they progress to the point of
committing overt criminal acts."' 54  The need to target and treat these
potential offenders seemed especially significant because of the
compulsive nature of their disorder; Wile made this connection most
explicitly when he asserted that only a medicalized approach could
eradicate the condition underlying an offender's behavior. Wile
concluded that
[t]herapy must therefore be individual, although the crime may be
social. The offense may admittedly be generic in nature but each
offender is a specific person. An offender may be legally punished
for his offense but he should be cured in the medical sense, if
possible. Only thus is he likely to be freed from his inclination or
tendency, his compulsion or desire to be an offender.155
As one of the most, if not the most, powerful forces driving the
individual citizen, sexuality and its misdirections could not be reined in by
mere punishment or prohibition, only dissected and hopefully redirected
through extensive medical treatment. In this realm compulsion and
volition no longer stood opposed, but rather collapsed into a single
channel: that of desire, which seemed equally unresisted and irresistible.
Over the next decade, writers outside of the medical and psychological
fields took up the cause of preventive treatment more widely. In a 1949
article, "The Sexual Psychopath and the Law," a social scientist and a
municipal court judge petitioned against conventional penal remedies and
for a more prophylactic program than the one most criminal jurisprudence
offered.'5 6
It is not intended to suggest that all recidivous sex offenders are
physically dangerous, but experience shows that some of them are
154. Richard A. McGee, Introduction to POLLENS, THE SEX CRIMINAL, supra note 133, at 13.
Pollens also recommended that the treatment of convicted sex offenders undergo revision to reflect the
goal ofprevention. Id. at 179.
155. Wile, supra note 149, at 31.
156. See James M. Reinhardt & Edward C. Fisher, The Sexual Psychopath and the Law, 39 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 734 (1949).
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compulsively so, and that most of them are driven by uncontrollable
impulsions that do not respond to customary legal procedures....
[R]ealism is an absolute essential in any attempts to control sex
'inebriates'. Reliance upon traditional juridical procedures has taken
us no where [sic].' 57
Like Wile's language, their description of the sexual psychopath evokes
a state of compromised or even immobilized volition: he is drunk on
perverse sexual desire, unable to resist every opportunity to consume
more.
Yet, despite their rhetoric about the need to structure medico-legal
efforts around a category of identity rather than categories of offenses-to
locate, identify, and direct treatment toward a certain kind of person-
psychiatrists remained strikingly unable to describe this person with any
specificity. Doctors' recognition of the cultural contingency and socio-
legal construction of sexual offenses, as well as the nature of an offender
whose culturally proscribed acts or desires rendered him a criminal,
oriented their focus toward the offender's relationship to reigning social
norms and their legal expression. Indeed, this focus facilitated the
ascription of one essential quality to these offenders in the face of a
system doctors perceived as potentially repressive and unjust: their
inability to conform their behavior to those norms despite enormous
cultural pressure to do so. The authors of "The Sexual Psychopath and the
Law" defined their object of inquiry thus: "Our attention is on the sex
aberrant who has demonstrated not merely a complete lack of social
responsibility for his sex acts, but also inability to achieve it. Such a one
is referred to in this paper as a 'sexual psychopath'." '158
The categories deployed to characterize the sex offender as a subject in
need of and susceptible to medical treatment rather than punishment
suffered from a certain instability that was to become increasingly evident.
American psychiatry in the first half of the last century represented a
dynamic field, newly recharged on the one hand by the values and goals of
the indigenous mental hygiene movement and on the other by the
methodology of the imported, though Americanized, psychoanalytic
school. Although psychiatrists saw in sex offenders the need for a
medically informed alternative to existing legal mechanisms, their ability
to articulate this need remained more certain than their ability to diagnose
and treat the figure over whom they were seeking jurisdiction. 9 The
result was a psychiatric discourse on sexual psychopathy that magnified in
157. Id. at 734.
158. Id. at 736.
159. For example, Karl Bowman and Milton Rosen noted "considerable disagreement about what
conditions or symptoms should be included under this classification [of sexual psychopath], and even
as to whether it really serves any useful purpose as a diagnostic category." A Criticism of the Current
Usage of the Term "Sexual Psychopath," 109 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 177, 178.
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insistence and influence in the absence of either precision or a concrete
plan of action. Despite the apparent mutability of the categories upon
which psychiatrists newly relied, efforts to reform the existing legal
regime deployed these categories with remarkable confidence.
IV. THE STATUTORY PSYCHOPATH
Despite alarmist rhetoric conjuring up rapists and child murderers
around every comer, an approach that identified desire with disease
quickly lost sight of violence and instead displaced anxieties about social
decay onto same-sex attraction. This section addresses the legislation and
adjudication of sexual psychopathy, demonstrating how fluid psychiatric
concepts underwent reification when imported into law.
A. Legislating sexual psychopathy
Legislators began importing the category of sexual psychopathy into
law in the mid-1930s. By 1939, nine states had enacted laws dealing
specifically with sex criminals that departed from the old offense-based
regime, and still others were considering their passage.160 Not only did
these statutes move away from the criminal law's traditional classificatory
schema, but moreover they substituted for conventional legal language a
psychological one that heralded a new authority for psychiatrists and their
ilk. This language conjured up a shadowy figure, defined less by acts he
did or might commit than by the challenge he allegedly posed to legal
authority. 161 In prescribing indefinite psychiatric commitment for persons
identified as criminal sexual psychopaths, these laws also occupied a kind
of liminal zone between the criminal and the civil systems, substituting
segregation and ostensibly treatment for punishment.
Two examples of the early laws were those enacted in Michigan and
Minnesota in 1937 and 1939, respectively. The Michigan law first
materialized in 1935, underwent revision in 1937, and in 1939 finally
evolved into the Sex Behavior Law Act 165.162 It provided that a person
guilty of illegal sexual behavior for a period of more than one year was
determined to be a criminal sexual psychopath, and as such should be
committed to the Department of Mental Health for confinement in a
suitable institution under the Department's supervision until cured of his
psychopathy. When both the Department and the committing court
deemed the person cured, he would be released immune from prosecution
for any offenses he may have committed during his psychopathic period.
Commitment, as well as parole when applicable, took on uncertain
160. See SHERWIN, supra note 138, at 58-59.
161. See Freedman, supra note 18, at 98.
162. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.967(1)-(9), enacted 1939, amended 1945, 1953.
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parameters under the sexual psychopath laws; since no separate facilities
yet existed to house this class of persons, commitment occurred usually in
a state hospital. Unlike Michigan's law, which gave courts recourse to an
alternative channel when a person was charged with a crime, several-
including Minnesota's--did not even require a criminal charge for sexual
psychopathy proceedings. These proceedings might ensue merely upon
the initiative of a government attorney after someone in the community
brought a suspected sexual deviant to her attention. Other states required
a criminal conviction to introduce these proceedings, yet the prescribed
commitment bore an uncertain relationship to a defendant's criminal
sentence.
The law directed toward those who were suggestively designated
"Sexual Irresponsibles" in Minnesota'63 survived a series of challenges on
the grounds of vagueness, equal protection, and due process that reached
the United States Supreme Court in 1940. By defining its target in broad
and indefinite language, the Minnesota law both invited and evaded these
charges: it described a variety of psychological conditions in fairly
imprecise terms, while linking these to danger in an immediate way.' 64 In
the words of the statute,
The term "psychopathic personality" as used in this act means the
existence in any person of such condition of emotional instability, or
impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards of good
judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of his acts, or a
combination of any such conditions, as to render such person
irresponsible for his conduct with respect to sexual matters and
thereby dangerous to other persons.' 65
Thus, the "Sexual Irresponsibles" law deployed the precise
symptomology of irresistible impulse together with the peculiar "lack of
customary standards of good judgment" language that had taken on new
significance in discussions of the sexual psychopath; through their
combination it suggested that such qualities rendered a person both
irresponsible and dangerous. The power of this association becomes
evident in the Minnesota Supreme Court's construction of the statute. The
court interpreted these words to
"include those persons who, by a habitual course of misconduct in
sexual matters, have evidenced an utter lack of power to control their
sexual impulses and who, as a result, are likely to attack or otherwise
163. MINN. STAT. §§ 526.09-11, enacted 1939, amended 1950, 1952.
164. Demonstrating the expansion of medical influence in legal matters that these laws
represented, the Minnesota Senate adopted a resolution that state bar and state medical associations
jointly appoint a committee to study psychopathic personalities on the same day that it passed the
sexual psychopath law. See James E. Hughes, The Minnesota "Sexual Irresponsibles " Law, 95
MENTAL HYGIENE 76, 85 (1941).
165. MINN. STAT. § 526.09.
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inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on the objects of their
uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire."1
66
On the basis of this construction, which annotated the original language
of the statute with extreme rhetoric and elaborated "danger" as violence,
the United States Supreme Court concurred with the Michigan court that
the statute was sufficiently precise to withstand challenge. , 67
Sexual psychopath laws found an early critic in James Hughes, who
compiled state laws for the Division of Mental Hygiene of the U.S. Public
Health Service. He wrote in 1941 of the possible dangers attending the
Minnesota law shortly after it was upheld by the Supreme Court. Hughes
began his review of the decision and its lingering uncertainties by
remarking that the question of whether the law's benefits would outweigh
its dangers "is of interest to all who meditate on the weakness of the
flesh ... .,,16' This comment is suggestive in at least two ways: first, it
acknowledges the ever-expanding community of commentators interested
in sexuality and its relationship to social order; and second, it implies that
the "weakness of the flesh" itself may implicate a far broader range of
people than the label "sexual psychopath" suggests, including the author
and his audience. This latter suggestion may have heightened the
perceived necessity to delimit the potential boundaries of the law's
application. Hughes recognized the double valence of the Supreme
Court's decision to uphold the Minnesota law, since the statute apparently
evinced medical sophistication at the same time that it potentially issued
from a desire to punish severely. In one respect, according to Hughes, the
decision's "greatest importance to mental hygienists is the fact that it
provided the setting for a recognition of a connection between the sphere
of sex and that of mental health."' 69 In another respect, he worried that
although "the legislation could be viewed in its patent aspects as a
laudable effort to treat rather than to punish the mentally ill, . .. what
about the possibility of a latent or unconscious effort on the part of the
drafters to punish for conduct that might otherwise be unpunishable, or at
any rate not punishable by life confinement?"1 70 Therein lay the paradox
of efforts to link sex to mental health: however humane they might seem,
they threatened, as Hughes indicated, to escalate rather than curtail its
punitive regulation.
166. State ex rel. Pearson v. Prob. Ct., 205 Minn. 245, 247 (1939).
167. See Minn. ex rel. Pearson v. Prob. Ct., 309 U.S. 270, 272 (1940). The Court went on to
dismiss an equal protection challenge because, while identifying a group within a larger class, the state
court did so "in terms which clearly show that the persons within that class constitute a dangerous
element within that community which the legislature in its discretion could put under appropriate
control." Id. at 275.
168. Hughes, supra note 164, at 76.
169. Id. at 79.
170. Id. at 81.
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Specifically, in reorienting the legal remedy away from punishment and
toward treatment at the hands of the psychiatric profession, proponents of
this approach also risked expanding the remedy's purview and severity.
Indeed, to the extent that sexual psychopath laws proceeded heedless of
particular acts, they could be wielded even more capriciously and to
greater harm than could the old statutory regime. With respect to the
Minnesota law, Hughes provided one salient example of an interpretation
that would orient its focus away from violent offenders and toward sexual
deviants of another sort.
To illustrate the vagueness of the law in the matter of the type of
sexual delinquent with which its proponents intended it to deal, it
might be mentioned that the present author first understood the
language of the act and of the two court decisions as referring
exclusively to those 'untalkables' who are more sinned against than
sinners-the homosexuals-particularly since the Minnesota court
had incidentally referred to the individuals subject to the law as
"unnaturals."17
'
Such an application, though seemingly incompatible with the judicial
construction of the statute, would nonetheless not have been unusual in the
cultural context of those years; indeed it would become still more likely in
the years following the Second World War.172
B. Adjudicating sexual psychopathy
In 1942, a case that arose on appeal under the Michigan statute seemed
either oblivious or indifferent to the medical ambiguities surrounding the
category of "sexual psychopath." Thus it shared with People v. Barnett a
wholesale adoption of the emergent medico-legal lexicon. The court
announced: "We recognize that criminal sexual psychopathic persons for
whom the statute seeks to provide, are a definite abnormal type,
recognized by the medical profession, who require confinement,
treatment, and care, both for their own protection and for the protection of
the public."'1 3 People v. Chapman demonstrates the kind of reasoning that
upheld sexual psychopath laws in the face of a series of constitutional
171. Id. at 79-80.
172. Hughes concluded his article with a universalizing gesture that served as a kind of warning.
Calling for more research and training of researchers into the problem inexpertly targeted by the
Minnesota law, he predicted that this research would yield not so much more knowledge of sexual
psychopathy as an indictment of social practices that engender such maladjustment.
Such scientists would undoubtedly locate within increasingly narrower limits the sources of
contamination of the river of life; and the world would probably be surprised to learn from them
how much crime, alcoholism, drug addiction, prostitution, self-destruction, marital failure
unhappy celibacy, economic distress, social and political unrest, and 'physical disease' are
caused by psychological maladjustment, and how much of this maladjustment flows from the
way in which society handles the problems that arise from the instinct known as sex.
Id. at 86.
173. People v. Chapman, 4 N.W.2d 18, 27 (Mich. 1942) (emphasis added).
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challenges, despite the indeterminate nature of the commitment to which a
so-called "sexual psychopath" was subjected. In response to due process
and other concerns, the Michigan Supreme Court understood the
proceedings involved to be civil rather than criminal, and the restraint
imposed on the subject of those proceedings to constitute treatment rather
than punishment. Charged with an act of gross indecency, defendant
Chapman underwent at the behest of the circuit court a psychiatric
examination and subsequent hearing on the question of his sexual
psychopathy. Based upon the charge under which Chapman entered the
criminal justice system, the psychiatric report, and testimony that various
witnesses presented at his hearing describing his involvement in other acts
of gross indecency over a period of years, the court not surprisingly
determined that Chapman was in fact a "criminal sexual psychopathic
person within the meaning of Act 165 of the Public Acts of 1939."
Accordingly, the court committed him to a state hospital until he
recovered "fully and permanently" from his condition.174
The psychiatric report that figured prominently in the disposition of
Chapman's case specified a diagnosis as follows: "1. Psychosexual
deviation, homosexual (sexual psychopath). 2. Intellectual level within
average limits but impaired by emotional regression. 3. Suggestive
symptoms of schizophrenia." 175 It went on to recommend "[s]egregation
in an appropriate institution for the treatment of disorders" because, the
doctors warned, "[h]e must be considered a distinct sexual menace and a
source of serious concern in a free community not only because of his
homosexual practices but also his psychosexual deviation is very likely to
assume a much more ominous manifestation, that of pedophilia (the use of
children as sexual objects)."' 176  Notwithstanding an orientation that
appeared to focus exclusively on adult sexual objects, the prospect of
incipient pedophilia in such a man seemed all but certain. In the words of
the court, "[a]lthough denying any advances toward children, that
possibility must be gravely considered. There is little likelihood that his
desire for sexual gratification by abnormal methods can be overcome soon
and further activity of a similar nature may be expected if he is allowed
freedom of access in a free community." 177 The court's reasoning here
was symptomatic both of currents of homophobia running through mid-
century America that conflated male homosexuality with pedophilia, and
of concerns about the nature of sexual compulsion as it putatively operated
upon sexual psychopaths. If left to its own devices, a psychopathic
person's compulsion might permeate every aspect of his behavior and
174. Id. at 23.
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escalate to the most gruesome heights.
Some confusion over the line delineating sexual psychopathy from
insanity appeared to motivate the defendant's claim on appeal that, since
the psychiatric report described him as insane, under the statute at issue
the court lacked jurisdiction to commit him as a criminal sexual
psychopath. Although the report explicitly declined to make a diagnosis
of insanity at that time, the qualities its authors ascribe to the defendant
bear some resemblance to those associated with certain versions of
insanity: "The psychiatrists' report indicates defendant's long indulgence
in perverted sex behavior, his lack of inhibitions, peculiarities, flights of
fancy, numerous abnormalities, and symptoms of schizophrenia." '78 In
distinguishing these qualities from a finding of insanity, however, the
court adhered to a stricter definition of that category, one that appears to
align itself with the cognitive models of the previous century. At the same
time, the court relegated the volitional disorders suggested by this
description of the defendant to the murky yet confidently wielded category
of "criminal sexual psychopathy."
Notwithstanding the adjective "criminal" attached to the label "sexual
psychopath," this court took particular pains to distinguish the proceedings
in question from criminal ones.179 And yet these proceedings did not
escape all due process considerations; the adjudicative role of the fact-
finder remained paramount, at least in theory. Despite their central role in
characterizing the individual under review, psychiatrists did not, the court
insisted, make the final determination of a person's status as a "criminal
sexual psychopathic person." Rather, "[t]he psychiatrists' report is only
for the help and guidance of the court in determining whether further
proceedings should be conducted. Only the court or a jury, if demanded,
could make a final determination as to whether or not defendant was a
criminal sexual psychopathic person."' 80  As with the insanity defense
then, the disposition of cases under sexual psychopath laws, while relying
on medical diagnosis, also required a translation from the psychiatric
classification to a legal designation. In essence, the sexual psychopath,
yoked to the idea of criminality, had become a medico-legal concept.
C. THE PARADIGMATIC SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH
The defendant's homosexuality, moreover, rendered him especially
vulnerable to a finding of sexual psychopathy. After the Second World
War, the sexual psychopath found an exemplar in the increasingly
conspicuous figure of the homosexual. The war itself brought a general
diminution in popular and legal interest in and concern over sex crimes
178. Id. at 23.
179. Id. at 25. The court further emphasized that the statute "makes sex deviators subject to
restraint because of their acts and condition, and not because of conviction and sentence for a criminal
offense." Id. at 26.
180. Id. at 27.
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and their perpetrators. As historians have demonstrated, the war also
marked a period of increased sexual freedom and decreased vigilance
around appropriate gender roles as single-sex military and civilian
communities became the norm. 18' In addition, with the national attention
directed toward a foreign enemy of monstrous proportions, domestic
threats such as perverted men and unruly women seemed to pale by
comparison. Psychiatric authority in the military represented one
exception to relative permissiveness toward behavior that hitherto had
occasioned intervention and even outrage; this authority was directed in
large part toward weeding suspected homosexuals out of military service,
although certainly not with the force that would be directed toward this
project in the years following the war.182 Moreover, this authority resulted
in more mainstream acceptance of psychiatric paradigms, especially
psychoanalytic ones, which now migrated from the pages of specialized
journals to the center of American cultural life.'83 But in the post-war era,
an enormous resurgence of interest in sexual and gender deviance
facilitated renewed efforts to medicalize, stigmatize, and criminalize
sexual nonconformity, in its consensual as well as its nonconsensual
forms. 1
84
Within the criminal justice system, psychiatrists wielded more authority
following the Second World War than ever before, an authority that
became evident in two post-war developments: increased state-sponsored
funding for psychiatric research into sexual offenders, and the
establishment of institutions specifically designed to treat sexual
181. See, e.g., ALLAN BPRUBt, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND
WOMEN IN WORLD WAR 11 (1991); JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE
MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970 23-39 (1983).
182. For example, recruits to the United States military were not asked the question "Are you
homosexual?" until World War II. The focus in prior years had been on criminal acts such as sodomy,
for which violators were subject to imprisonment. But once psychiatrists became involved in ferreting
out homosexuals as unfit for military service, a whole psychiatric/classificatory apparatus was brought
to bear on the process. See NEIL MILLER, OUT OF THE PAST: GAY AND LESBIAN HISTORY FROM 1869
TO THE PRESENT 231-41 (1995); BtRUBE, supra note 181, at 8-11; Freedman, supra note 18, at 92.
According to Brub6, psychiatrists succeeded in asserting unprecedented authority in the U.S. military
during the Second World War largely because of the severe psychological damage the previous war
was thought to have caused. Their investigation of homosexuality began as a wide-scale effort to
eliminate the mentally unstable from service. The Surgeon General issued a memo in 1943 advocating
procedures to deal with homosexuality in the military more sympathetic to psychiatric reasoning than
to that of the criminal law, thereby prompting the War Department Circular No. 3, which
recommended separation rather than court martial for the "true or confirmed homosexual." See
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurisprudence and the Apartheid of the Closet, 1946-1961, 24 FL.
ST. U. L. REV. 703, 734-35 (1997).
183. Psychiatric ideas also found their way into the mainstream media, and nowhere more so than
in Hollywood-the 1940s and 1950s were the golden era of psychoanalytic cinema. In addition, by
the end of World War II, the United States hosted more psychoanalysts than did the rest of the world
combined. Psychoanalytic psychiatry became relevant to the pressing issues of immigration as well as
to those of war-related neuroses in the post-war era. See EDWARD DOLNICK, MADNESS ON THE
COUCH 58 (1998); Frederick Whiting, Bodies of Evidence: Post-War Detective Fiction and the
Monstrous Origins of the Sexual Psychopath, 18 YALE J. CRITICISM 149 (2005).
184. See Eskridge, supra note 182, at 711.
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offenders.' By the time California published the results of special
research on "sexual deviation" in 1953, the second such publication in two
years from that state, more than a third of the states in addition to the
District of Columbia had special statutes addressing "sexual psychopaths"
and their disposition.1 86 These laws varied in several respects: the extent
to which they attempted to describe their object; the requirements for
triggering the law; and the type and scope of hearing and/or medical
examination necessary to establish sexual psychopathy. For example,
whereas Ohio's law specified the qualities of a psychopathic offender in
some detail, 187 New York's law did not attempt to define "sexual
psychopath" at all. Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan all required a criminal
charge but not a conviction; California's law permitted a hearing to
determine sexual psychopath to be initiated upon conviction of any
criminal offense. In Massachusetts, Minnesota, and the District of
Columbia, no formal criminal charge was necessary to initiate an
investigation. 8 8  New York's law prescribed an indeterminate
commitment of one day to life that technically constituted a criminal
sentence, designed so that when the defendant had completed his
commitment, he could not receive further confinement related to the same
charges.
These discrepancies, and in particular the imprecision surrounding the
definition of "sexual psychopath" in those laws that sought to identify this
category of person, began to engender grave reservations among both
medical and legal commentators. They worried that these laws reflected
too much pseudo-medicine and too little legal reasoning. Two authors
reviewing recent medico-legal opinion on such laws as part of California's
published Sexual Deviation Research in 1952 concluded: "The term
sexual psychopath, sex offender or psychopathic offender as used to
denote a special class, is not a concise medical classification. Moreover it
is unwise to freeze into legal terms medical diagnoses and terminology
that are likely to be changed and otherwise improved in the near future." ''9
185. See Freedman, supra note 18, at 99.
186. As of 1953 sexual psychopath laws existed in the following jurisdictions: Alabama,
California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. Wisconsin's sexual
psychopath law, enacted in 1947, was repealed in 1951. Iowa enacted a law in 1955. See Eskridge,
supra note 182 at Appendix 4, 825-26; see also Karl M. Bowman & Bernice Engle, Synopses of
Special Sex Psychopath Laws-United States, in LANGLEY PORTER NEUROPSYCHIATRIC INSTITUTE,
CALIFORNIA SEXUAL DEVIATION RESEARCH 41-58 (1953).
187. A person convicted of certain sex and other felonies in Ohio might trigger a hearing on his
psychopathy if he evinced one or more of the following qualities: "emotional immaturity and
instability, impulsive, irresponsible, reckless and unruly acts, excessively self-centered attitudes,
deficient powers of self-discipline, lack of normal capacity to learn from experience, marked
deficiency of moral sense or control." Bowman & Engle, supra note 186, at 53.
188. See id.
189. Karl M. Bowman & Bernice Engle, A Review of Recent Medicolegal Opinion Regarding Sex
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In their opinion, psychiatric knowledge could be most helpful at a later
stage in the legal process for dealing with such offenders. Rather than
attempting to determine their medical status in order to resolve their legal
disposition, they suggested, courts should pursue a conventional legal
trajectory first and only then bring in the psychiatric perspective. 190 In a
still more emphatic statement, sociologist Edwin Sutherland displayed his
misgivings over the kind of reasoning that legitimated that transfer of
jurisdiction in this area from law to psychiatry: "There is no more reason
for turning over to the psychiatrist the complete supervision of a criminal
who is found to be psychopathic than for turning over to the dentist the
complete supervision of a criminal who is found to have dental
cavities."' 9' Sutherland's skepticism notwithstanding, though, such a
transfer was indeed taking place; psychiatric arguments had proven
effective, and now commentators were left to weigh the consequences.
In particular, the association of sexual psychopathy with homosexuality
only ossified as more states adopted special legislation dealing with sex
offenders after World War II. In Estelle Freedman's account, while the
rhetoric surrounding the sexual psychopath laws and the sex crime panic
in general purported to represent a concern over the welfare of women and
children, in fact professional discussions largely elided women's interests.
Rather, these discussions focused on delineating normal from abnormal
male sexuality, especially white male sexuality. If earlier discourses
marginalized the rapist as a "sick man," thus suggesting that sexual
violence against women was exceptional and its perpetrators pathological,
by the 1950s masculine virility became continuous with a certain element
of aggression. As a result, pedophilia and homosexuality, rather than rape
and murder, became the offenses most often associated with the diagnosis
of the criminal sexual psychopath. 92 Moreover, racial hierarchies that
cast African Americans and other people of color as both ontogenetically
and phylogenetically primitive fed a medico-legal discourse that
medicalized white offenders, whose deviations putatively represented a
pathological disruption of normal human development, while continuing
to criminalize non-white offenders.' 93 On the one hand, then, this era
witnessed a more open popular discourse around sexual practices-and a
concomitant acknowledgment of their diversity-with the research of
Alfred Kinsey and his followers (Kinsey's landmark study of male
sexuality was published in 1948, the companion volume on female
Laws, in LANGLEY PORTER NEUROPSYCHIATRIC INSTITUTE, CALIFORNIA SEXUAL DEVIATION
RESEARCH 105, 120 (1952).
190. See id.
191. Edwin H. Sutherland, The Sexual Psychopath Laws, 40 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 543,
554 (1950).
192. See Freedman, supra note 18, at 102.
193. See Robertson, supra note 83, at 4.
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sexuality in 1953),194 and thus arguably an expansion of the purview of
"normal" sexuality. On the other hand, it simultaneously provoked a
heightened stigmatization of sexual orientations that departed from a
robust heterosexual ideal, in particular male homosexuality, which had
become continuous with pedophilia in the popular imagination.1 95
The logic of medicalization proved to be highly persuasive, casting
sexual outlaws as psychiatric specimens in need of microscopic and expert
investigation. In Utah, for example, where no laws directed specifically
toward sexual psychopaths yet existed by 1949, the state supreme court
invoked this logic in suggesting that a punitive approach toward
homosexual offenses contravened modem medical knowledge.
Congenital homosexuals, and to a certain extent, psychopathic
homosexuals, may be wholly unresponsible for their homosexual
acts. They are motivated by biological and physiological factors
which may be beyond their power to combat or control. And while
such persons cannot be left to prey upon society, and particularly
upon young children, the wisdom of declaring their conduct to be
criminal may be seriously questioned. In the light of advanced
biological and medical knowledge, the legislature might well provide
for their confinement in sanitaria for necessary treatment. 96
No longer could these deviants be held responsible for their behavior.
Homosexuals in particular were becoming the incarnation of irresistible
impulse, plagued by the now-medicalized condition of being unable to
abide by the law.
Third among the first fourteen cases adjudicated as sexual psychopaths
in one unnamed jurisdiction was, according to one judge critical of the
laws, "[a] non-aggressive homosexual convicted of passing bad
checks."' 97 This example demonstrates not only the extent to which the
sexual psychopath laws facilitated the ferreting out and subsequent
isolation of a variety of sexual deviants, but also the extent to which a
person's actual conduct, the offenses for which she might come under the
jurisdiction of the law, had become a kind of symptom of a deeper psychic
identity and thus seemed incidental to her true status. Nowhere was this
194. See ALFRED KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948); SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953).
195. See Eskridge, supra note 18, at 1059-62.
196. State v. Cooper, 201 P.2d 764, 767 (Utah, 1949). Utah finally enacted such a law in 1951.
See UTAH CODE ANN. §77-49-1 to 8 (amended 1953).
197. The other thirteen of the fourteen men committed as sexual psychopaths came before the
court for the following (some without a formal criminal charge): (1) public masturbation, no indecent
exposure; (2) following of a white female by a black man, no assault or approach; (4) touching of a
woman's breast in a department store; (5) addiction to indecent exposure when intoxicated; (6)
indecent exposure; had been propositioned and manipulated by a "wanton female" in the movies; (7-9)
habitual indecent exposure; (10-12) homosexual acts with young males; (13) assault on a young girl;
(14) sex with "(experienced) juvenile females." MORRIS PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 237 (1951).
See also KARPMAN, supra note 3, at 229, for a very close reproduction of this list.
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eclipse of actual acts by claimed or ascribed identity more significant than
in the area of homosexuality.
V. THE HIDDEN HOMOSEXUAL
With the identification of homosexuality as a psychopathic condition
that eluded conventional channels of regulation, medico-legal culture
demonstrated both the force and the limits of juridical models predicated
on psychiatric categories. Below I describe a new jurisprudence of
identity that emerged to accommodate psychiatric insights into sexual
disorders. First, though, I situate this development within evolving
conceptions of homosexuality that contributed to the mid-century efforts
to contain the ungovernable.
A. The medical model of homosexuality
During the first ten years of its sexual psychopath law, Michigan
committed 237 "criminal sexual psychopaths," of whom, according one
psychiatrist writing about the law in 1949, "40 per cent showed
homosexual deviation." '198 Why did Americans' anxieties around sex and
crime, and legislators' regulatory efforts to contain the threat allegedly
posed by the criminal sexual psychopath, get displaced onto
homosexuality (especially male homosexuality)? Legal scholar William
Eskridge suggests that this association originated with Freudian
psychoanalysis, at least in its American incarnations. As early as the
1920s in the United States, he writes, "the homosexual was the
quintessential psychopath, for he was by Freudian definition a man whose
sexual development had been derailed, rendering him intrinsically
perverted."' 99 Although I do not dispute Eskridge's description of the
degree to which the homosexual became a kind of stand-in for the
psychopath in the popular and legal imaginations, I would argue that the
reasoning behind this conflation was not strictly Freudian in origin. While
the Freudians and those who Americanized psychoanalytic theory did in
part associate homosexuality with a kind of perverse regression or
digression from the normal course of (heterosexual) development, this
association does not begin to account for the identity of the psychopath.
For psychopaths were not merely regressives or developmental anomalies;
they were, more importantly, ungovernable subjects-incapable of
conforming their behavior to social norms, unable to comply with legal
mandates. A psychiatric concept in its inception, the psychopath grew to
198. George E. Cook, Problem of the Criminal Sexual Psychopath, 10 DISEASES OF THE
NERVOUS SYSTEM 137, 139 (1949). The author was the Medical Superintendent of the Ionia State
Hospital for the Criminal Insane. By comparison, over the same decade California committed 522
sexual psychopaths to mental hospitals under its governing laws.
199. Eskridge, supra note 18, at 1063.
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embody a formidable threat to law, to legal reason, and to legal remedies.
Historians of sexuality have written extensively about the shift from a
crime model to a medical model of homosexuality, a shift that began in the
last third of the nineteenth century and declined, at least institutionally,
with the removal of homosexuality from the third edition of the American
Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-III) in
1974. 0  Moreover, the medical professions of Western Europe diagnosed
homosexuality as a pathological condition at roughly the same time that
the homosexual as an identity category began supplanting the sodomite of
a criminal law that proscribed a variety of nonprocreative, interspecies,
and same-sex sexual practices within a nonidentitarian framework. 201
Whereas early nineteenth-century discussions of deviance sought answers
to the question of its origins first in the body of the offender and
subsequently in her brain,2" 2 by the latter half of the century, corporeal
explanations for deviance had given way to psychological ones.203  The
new science of "sexology" availed itself of both investigative modes,
anatomical and psychological. Because sexology could no longer link the
subject's behavior to a particular organ or body part, it wrestled with the
problem of deviance as unlocalizable, invisible, and therefore difficult to
detect or explain with any certainty. The "sexual instinct" was born of this
psychological turn in medical reasoning; with its appearance came a field
of inquiry that sought answers to the enigmas of the self in a newly posited
sexual core. 20 4  In Krafft-Ebing's work, the perverted manifestations of
this instinct received their most extensive, though not their first, treatment;
"contrary sexual instinct" figured most prominently among them.2 °5
200. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 3d (DSM-I1) (1974). See generally RONALD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF DIAGNOSIS (1981).
201. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME ONE (Robert Hurley
trans., 1978) (1976); JONATHAN NED KATZ, THE INVENTION OF HETEROSEXUALITY (1995); JEFFREY
WEEKS, SEX, POLITICS AND SOCIETY: THE REGULATION OF SEXUALITY SINCE 1900 (1981); Jean-
Claude Feray & Manfred Herzer, Homosexual Studies and Politics in the 19th Century: Karl Maria
Kertbeny, 19 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 23 (1990).
202. Doctors frequently performed anatomical research on law-breakers, including sodomites and
onanists.
203. See ARNOLD DAVIDSON, THE EMERGENCE OF SEXUALITY: HISTORICAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND
THE EMERGENCE OF CONCEPTS 1-29 (2001). Davidson locates the invention of perversion as a new
technology of the self in the late nineteenth century.
204. "[N]ineteenth-century psychiatry took sexuality to be the way in which the mind is
represented. To know a person's sexuality is to know that person.... Sexuality individualizes, turns
one into a specific kind of human being-a sadist, masochist, homosexual, fetishist. This link between
sexuality and individuality explains some of the passion with which psychiatry investigated the
perversions." Id. at 63-64.
205. Indeed, several English translations (the 1893, 1900 and 1906 editions) titled Krafft-Ebing's
copious study Psychopathia Sexualis, with especial reference to contrary sexual instinct: a medico-
legal study. As the inverse of normative heterosexuality, the "precise reversal" of what sexologist
Albert Moll termed "Kontrektation" or the "relationship drive," homosexuality described a deviation
of the sexual instinct. See Gert Hekma, A History of Sexology: Social and Historical Aspects of
Sexuality, in FROM SAPPHO TO DE SADE: MOMENTS IN THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 174, 179 (Jan N.
Bremmer ed., 1989). Although the source of this deviation resided in the desiring subject, its
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Homosexuality repeatedly traversed diagnostic parameters in the work
of Krafft-Ebing, Havelock Ellis, and others, however. For instance, the
distinction between perversion and perversity on which Krafft-Ebing
relied complicated the distinction between homosexuality and
heterosexuality. While "perversion" described subjects whose identity,
either congenitally or circumstantially acquired, compelled their deviance,
"perversity," as an effort to reinscribe a model of volition, referred to
moral corruption on the part of subjects who acted out of free will; the
former category rendered legal intervention problematic at best. Were
people who acted homosexually out of perversity then properly classified
as homosexuals? Or were they more accurately understood as
heterosexuals practicing, willfully and knowingly, a kind of criminal
homosexuality? Since Psychopathia Sexualis set out in large part to
delineate areas of sexuality that were susceptible to legal regulation and
punitive treatment from those existing outside the realm of criminal/legal
responsibility, such distinctions were wholly apposite, if incoherent.
Claims about accountability that isolated acts from identities thus suffered
from the slipperiness of these categories.
Further, despite the paradigm shift from crime to disease for viewing
homosexuality, the medical commentators who took up the question of
homosexuality's pathological nature, its origins and its prognosis for cure,
still did so largely in dialogue with legislators and judges. Indeed, most
works on homosexuality that appeared around the turn of the century
addressed a legal, as well as a medical, audience. Notwithstanding
repeated insistence upon the need to abandon the focus on illegal sexual
acts in favor of investigating homosexual identity--or the person of whose
identity homosexuality constituted an essential, even if acquired, feature-
this dialogue with the legal profession nonetheless both presumed and
posited the homosexual as a juridical subject in his or her own right. This
juridical subject, while allegedly pathological and therefore of limited
responsibility for her behavior, moreover emerged as a figure with
ambiguous legal status, if not as a criminal.2"6 So the homosexual entered
the twentieth century as a medico-legal conundrum, occupying a
netherworld between sex practices and sexual identity, between gender
and sexuality, and between volition and compulsion.
When Freud wrote the first version of his Three Essays on the Theory of
Sexuality (1905), he devoted a significant portion of his chapter on "The
Sexual Aberrations" to a discussion of inversion, still the reigning
paradigm for understanding homosexuality. For Freud, homosexuality
relational nature brought it uncomfortably close to heterosexuality.
206. Most of these early writers on homosexuality favored the decriminalization of homosexual
acts and viewed the punitive regulation of such acts as the source of much additional crime-such as
blackmail, a weapon frequently wielded against gay men during this period-as well as neurosis. See,
e.g., DEAN, supra note 63; WEEKS, supra note 201, at 24-27; Oosterhaus, supra note 105.
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was reducible neither to sexual acts nor to a pathological identity; rather,
it described a kind of destination or orientation that featured same-sex
objects over others. In a 1903 interview with the Vienna newspaper Die
Zeit regarding the trial of a prominent Viennese man charged with
homosexual practices, Freud championed both the decriminalization of
homosexuality and a perspective on the subject that eschewed the rhetoric
of pathology: "I advocate the standpoint that the homosexual does not
belong before the tribunal of a court of law. I am even of the firm
conviction that homosexuals must not be treated as sick people, for a
perverse orientation is far from being a sickness ... ." 207 American
doctors, although purporting to carry on a legacy whose origins lay with
early sexology and Freudian psychoanalysis, actually deviated from this
legacy in significant ways.208  In the United States, the view that
understood homosexuality as an illness rather than as a deliberate
flaunting of legal and moral strictures presented itself as an antidote to the
reigning legal perspective as reflected in Draconian sodomy laws, laws
against gross indecency and vagrancy, and others directed at least in part
toward homosexuals and their sexual practices. Some members of the
American psychoanalytic community sought to cure homosexuality, either
by righting the wrong in psychosexual development or by strengthening
the will against acting on perverse impulses; others deemed it a hopeless
cause.
These pejorative and moralizing approaches to male homosexuality
were in fact the particular province of the American analysts, of whose
attitudes Freud disapproved strongly.2 °9 Freud's disdain for American
moralism with regard to sexuality did not, however, align him with the
earliest proponents of homosexual rights, Karl Ulrichs and Magnus
Hirschfeld. The former originated the concept of inversion and the latter
perpetuated this understanding of homosexuals as a distinct species with
the notion of an "intermediate sex." Unlike these men, Freud generally
propounded a universalizing model of homosexuality. He observed, for
example, in the famous 1915 addition to Three Essays on the Theory of
Sexuality (1905), that homosexual inclinations constitute a pervasive force
in our unconscious lives.2" 0
Psycho-analytic research is most decidedly opposed to any attempt at
207. Quoted in Henry Abelove, Freud, Male Homosexuality, and the Americans, in THE LESBIAN
AND GAY STUDIES READER 381, 382 (Abelove et al. eds., 1993).
208. See id.
209. Both Abelove and Paul Robinson emphasize the extent to which the American analysts'
pathologizing approach to homosexuality departed from Freud's, which, while "normalizing," did not
understand homosexuality as an illness. See Paul Robinson, Freud and Homosexuality, in
HOMOSEXUALITY & PSYCHOANALYSIS 91-97 (Tim Dean & Christopher Lane eds., 2001).
210. Sigmund Freud, Three essays on the Theory of Sexuality, in 7 STANDARD EDITION OF THE
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separating off homosexuals from the rest of mankind as a group of a
special character. By studying sexual excitations other than those
that are manifestly displayed, it has found that all human beings are
capable of making a homosexual object-choice and have in fact made
211one in their unconscious.
Yet American psychoanalysts and analytic psychiatrists took two
different, but distinctly anti-Freudian, perspectives on homosexuality: one
homophobic and moralistic, advocating psychoanalysis as the most
hopeful "cure" for homosexuality; the other less homophobic, promoting
tolerance, but also minoritizing in a way that carved out a discrete identity
for homosexuals. It was this latter perspective that prevailed in debates
over whether or not to declassify homosexuality from the American
Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-III) of
psychiatric disorders.212
B. Psychiatry and "the problem of homosexuality"
In 1937, an article published in the American Journal of Psychiatry
quoted Ben Karpman asserting that "the problem of psychiatry will not be
solved until we solve the problem of homosexuality."2 13  American
psychiatric interest in the issue of homosexuality, although perceptible in
the 1920s, began to flourish in the 1930s. Homosexuality was the sexual
deviation par excellence: it represented a radical departure from the course
of normal sexuality on the one hand, enough so that its subjects appeared
to constitute a different species of person. 4 Yet on the other hand, those
Who deviated in this respect were difficult, if not impossible, to discern in
all other respects. The task for the psychiatric community was to
formulate a procedure for identifying such people, for studying their
personality structures and their evolution such that others might be, if
possible, rescued from this fate.
Prevailing theories of homosexuality circulating at the time posited a
fundamental distinction between "true" or "congenital" homosexuals-
usually associated with some variety of gender dysphoria-and those
whose condition was "acquired," either through some flaw or unfortunate
disruption of their psychosexual development or voluntarily in response to
211. Id.
212. Homosexuality was finally "delisted" in the 1973 edition of the DSM-111.
213. Quoted in George W. Henry, Psychogenic Factors in Overt Homosexuality, 93 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 889, 906 (1937).
214. As two military psychiatrists wrote in 1944, "the homosexual is an exclusive personality
type, clearly different from the psychiatric disorders under which it has being catalogued [e.g.,
neurotic, psychopathic, schizoid, or psychotic], and should be designated as such." Herbert Greenspan
& John D. Campbell, The Homosexual as a Personality Type, 101 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 682, 682
(1944). These authors agreed with the British sexologist Havelock Ellis that homosexuality was not a
disease but rather a congenital anomaly. See id. at 682-83.
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the exigencies of their environment. 1 5  Since psychoanalysis had
succeeded in broadly inculcating the importance of psychosexual
development for adult identity, failures or interruptions in this
development loomed large as potential triggers for adult deviation.
Maternal behavior emerged as paramount: excessive dominance or
passivity on the mother's part posed grave dangers.21 6 Hence a rich array
of problems occupied the psychiatric community: ferreting out the
homosexuals from their heterosexual neighbors; distinguishing the true
homosexuals from the circumstantial ones; describing the precise nature of
the true homosexual; excavating the factors that led to homosexuality in
noncongenital cases; and, finally, devising a means of dealing with
homosexuals that would replace traditional criminal measures.
While Karpman was making his dramatic pronouncement regarding the
coupled fates of homosexuality and the psychiatric profession, a book
appeared entitled Mentality and Homosexuality that offered one of the first
extensive disquisitions on the subject ostensibly for the general reader.
The author gathered his data from psychiatric work with a group of prison
inmates incarcerated for a variety of offenses. Another psychiatrist wrote
a forward for the book in which he emphasized its timeliness, identifying
in recent years "an increasing interest on the part of the layman ... in
homosexuality and other types of abnormal sexual behavior. 2 17 He
attributed this interest in part to the "wide publicity given to atrocious
murders committed under circumstances strongly suggesting perverted
states of mind. . . " as well as "[t]he wide distribution of the standard
works of Havelock Ellis, Wilhelm Steckel, Kraft-Ebbing and others," '218
which, he noted,
has aroused in the mind of the casual observer a keen interest in the
man who lives apart. Certain situations are prone to bring about a
milieu in which homosexuality seems to flourish. The congregation
of large masses of men with restricted liberties is the culture medium
in which the bacillus homosexual, if one may be allowed the analogy,
flourishes. Army and Navy barracks, construction camps and prisons
peculiarly lend themselves to this situation. Nevertheless, one must
215. The military psychiatrists, for example, deployed Krafft-Ebing's taxonomy to convey the
difference: "The term perversion signifies a voluntary turning from the correct path of truth and
propriety. In contradistinction, the true homosexual, because of his biologic constitution, is
involuntarily directed toward homosexualism." Id. at 687.
216. In one study of seven delinquent boys, all involved in destructive and even criminal
behavior, the author concluded that they were all gender dysphoric and therefore passive homosexuals
because of their castrating mothers: "The mothers and grandmothers of these boys are all aggressive,
dominant, rejecting, punitive women. They are women who more or less despise the adult males they
have known and feel themselves capable, superior and in control." Martha Wilson MacDonald,
Criminally Aggressive Behavior in Passive, Effeminate Boys, 8 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 70, 71
(1938).
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also recognize that the type of individual who is inclined to
homosexuality gravitates to these centers. He lacks the ability and
inclination to create a home environment of his own. Consequently,
he must accept that created for him by others.
A discussion of a topic of this nature, however, would be incomplete
if attention were not called to the fact that large numbers of
homosexually inclined individuals live within the community itself.
These people proceed about their daily tasks without attracting undue
attention. In many instances, they are without a full realization of the
limitations placed on them. While the condition of overt acts is
undoubtedly common in this group, nevertheless, such manifestations
are not necessary to fixate the libido at the homosexual level. The
attitude taken by the individual toward his relationship to his fellow
man and woman largely determines the level of his sexual
development. The sexual act itself need not enter into the picture.
These attitudes, of course, are patterned by unconscious motivations
often so deeply rooted as to be almost non-eradicable.219
I reproduce this lengthy passage because it dramatizes several of the
most salient psychiatric tropes for representing and analyzing
homosexuality in this period: contagious identity, instability, dangerous
invisibility,22° and psycho-sexual fixation. First, it raises the question of
etiology: do particular environments produce homosexuals, or do those
existing a priori merely flock to such environments? The author suggested
that the answer is both; like any germ or pathogen, the "bacillus"
homosexual is attracted to certain easily infected settings, and then
reproduces in those settings, rendering them still more susceptible to
infection. Second, the passage points to the difficulty inherent in attempts
to identify homosexuals when many of them fade into invisibility within
the larger population. Such persons blend so well into their communities
because, the author implied, they display no manifest differences from
their heterosexual neighbors and family members, not even a different set
of sexual practices. Some homosexuals do not act homosexually, indeed
do nothing to draw attention to themselves; but the critical factor that,
though requiring a trained scientific eye to detect, nonetheless marks their
status as a species apart is their attitude, possibly unconscious and thus all
the more "ineradicable."
The logic that thus separated a homosexual essence from all manifest
behavior marked the heart of psychiatric reasoning, a reasoning primarily
219. Id. at 5-6.
220. An example of the trope of dangerous invisibility appears in Kahn's work: "A person whom
one would least suspect may be a homosexual." KAHN, supra note 217, at 136. Pollens claimed that
"[t]here are a very large number of homosexuals in this country. Many are married and give to the
outside world a semblance of normality but they secretly carry out their real pleasures." POLLENS,
supra note 133, at 132.
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interested in a person's fantasies and thought processes and only dimly in
that person's actual acts-hence the emphasis on the criminal rather than
the crime. Indeed, from the earliest sexological and psychoanalytic
accounts of homosexuality, acts and practices were secondary, if not
irrelevant, to the construction of a homosexual identity. When doctors did
link homosexuals to various forms of criminality, these usually did not
entail specific sexual practices; rather, doctors focused on such
phenomena as drug addiction, blackmail, and kleptomania. 2  Although
most of the writings on homosexuality from the 1930s and 1940s set out
precisely to elaborate upon homosexuality in exact scientific terms, the
definitions with which they identified their object of study proved to be
impossibly elastic-a factor they largely ignored but that emerges starkly
with historical hindsight. In the words of Doctor Samuel Kahn, author of
Mentality and Homosexuality:
Homosexuality may be manifested by men's remaining bachelors or
women's remaining spinsters, or by alcoholism and other addictions,
or by various symptoms of neuroses and psychoses, by criminality,
instability, peculiar cravings, dress, peculiar hobbies and interests and
most of all by eccentric and abnormal loves.... Homosexuality may
be passive, active, conscious, unconscious or it may alternate or it
may represent any of the above traits in combination.222
Equally imprecise was the author's explicit attempt to define
homosexuality:
For the purpose of clarity, the following definition is given. The term
homosexual indicates a person whose passions and attractions are for
members of his own sex rather than for members of the opposite sex;
whose sentiments and emotions are directed toward members of his
own sex in the same way that, normally, they would exist toward
members of the opposite sex. A homosexual, then, is not only in love
with a member of his own sex, but has an emotional makeup of the
opposite sex so that he could attract his own sex ....
Kahn's rhetoric here of course thwarted his professed "purpose."
Rather than point to overt identifying features or behaviors, Kahn wrote of
"passions and attractions," "sentiments and emotions,' ''love," and an
221. One humorous counterexample is a virulently anti-homosexual article appearing in a 1929
volume of the Urologic and Cutaneous Review, where the author suggested that the crimes to which
homosexuality putatively led often had an implicit, rather than an explicit, sexual component: "We
note some writers say that perversions have neither a social nor a forensic value, if the public is not
injured; that they are only biological variations. But society and the law have a different viewpoint.
The social must always prevail over the individual attitude. It might be interesting to note here that
many homosexual kleptomaniac women are prone to steal silk underwear." John F. W. Meagher,
Homosexuality: Its Psychobiological and Psychopathological Significance, 33 UROLOGIC &
CUTANEOUS REV. 505, 518 (1929).
222. KAHN, supra note 217, at 20-22.
223. Id. at 14.
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"emotional makeup., 224 Even when describing sexual acts performed by
his homosexual subjects, Kahn allowed the elastic logic of identity to
govern. Relating the circumstances of one lesbian member of the prison
population, he recounted how "[s]he met a male homosexual; indulged in
the rectal method, was later introduced to other homosexuals and then
continued homosexual acts. 2 25 In an effort to acquaint the reader with
this arcane world, he explained that "[a] fish is a male homosexual who
has a mouth homosexual relation with a female homosexual. 22 6
Strikingly, here the identities of the actors determined the status of their
acts: anal intercourse between a man and a woman became a "homosexual
act" because both participants were identified as homosexual; oral sex
between a man and a woman was a "homosexual relation."
Throughout his investigation, Khan characterized what he termed
"homosexual acts" as a product of "indulgence." The rhetoric of
indulgence was enormously common in the literature of these decades
with respect to homosexuality. Indeed, whether wittingly or unwittingly
on the part of commentators, homosexuality emerged in these writings as a
great temptation to be resisted.227  Those who failed to resist in a
consistent manner, even if only at an unconscious level, constituted the
homosexuals. 228  As with the psychopath, then, one persistent feature
attached to the homosexual was a failure of self-control: she was not
master of her will. Psychiatric discourse associated homosexuality with
an already weakened will, or alternatively (and sometimes concomitantly)
described homosexuality as leading to a further erosion of morality. In
Kahn's assessment of the homosexual inmates he encountered,
Their I.Q's do not prove them to be definitely mentally defective. But
in a sense they are moral defectives, meaning that they do not know
or have not sufficient insight to realize what is right and what is
wrong to the same degree as an average person. By that statement it
is not meant that in general they do not know the difference between
right and wrong, but it does mean that they have less emotional
stability to help them choose and do the ethical and conventional
act.229
224. Id.
225. Id. at 41.
226. Id. at 124.
227. Doctor Meagher even remarked ruefully that "[h]omosexual relations once experienced,
produce a craving for repetition." Meagher, supra note 22 1, at 512.
228. For instance, Kahn differentiated between the heterosexuals who "indulged" sparingly in
such activity and the homosexuals who were unable to exercise such moderation: "It is known for a
fact that a number of normal individuals indulge sparingly in homosexual acts in the active capacity
and, with less frequency, in the passive capacity." KAHN, supra note 217 at 135. Alfred Herzog made
a similar distinction in his treatise on Medical Jurisprudence, whose taxonomy of sexual deviations
included Number 790: "Homo-sexual practices indulged in by hetero-sexuals." HERZOG, supra note
2, at 566.
229. KAHN, supra note 217, at 101.
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If the problem with homosexuals emanated from their underdeveloped
wills, or what Kahn here called "emotional stability," then the solution
was to strengthen those wills and instill sufficient hardiness to resist
temptation-or at least to be able to choose their indulgences rather than
be forced by compulsion to succumb.23 Treatment, he advised, should
include "above all the establishment and stimulation (by various
psychological methods) of the will power and tendencies towards
normality."23' But that process was not so easy; it required assiduous
intervention and treatment on the part of the doctor: "Of course the big
problem is how to train the will.... By constant drilling, encouraging and
hammering upon these subjects for a considerable period and in the proper
environments, the 'will' may be made an agent for therapy in
homosexuality." '232 Far from enjoying free will and rationality, then, the
homosexual remained captive to his impulses and emotions until
undergoing a kind of boot-camp training which, if successful, might
liberate his will from its shackles.233
Paradoxically enough, despite the characterization of homosexuality as
a condition of self-dispossession, psychiatrists also ascribed to the
homosexual an incorrigible narcissism suggesting an excess of selfhood.
As painstakingly as doctors attempted to fashion a differential schema that
would account for homosexual desire-for example, the attraction of a
gay man's feminine essence for a male object; the passion a feminine
woman inspired in a lesbian with a male "sex-soul"-the fundamental
problem was that, for all intents and purposes, homosexuality represented
a turning away from difference. Deep and irreducible differences between
men and women organized the ideology of gender, and thus the structures
of social relations; these differences also organized the ideology of
heterosexuality, which had become resexualized following World War
I.234 Men desiring men and women desiring women seemed a renunciation
of all that responsible, hygienic social and sexual relations required. For
Kahn, this renunciation took on the proportions of complete self-adulation:
"The homosexual loves or appears to love his own sex, but even a
superficial examination shows this to be but a part of his narcissism. In
truth, he loves neither man nor woman." '235  In this formulation,
homosexuality rendered a person incapable of a sentiment deserving of the
name "love" directed toward any other person. Rather, it involved base
230. Id. at 88.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 90-92.
233. It is particularly suggestive that the will rather than the person emerges from this boot camp
as an "agent."
234. Sexual pleasure was now privileged as perhaps the most important component of a healthy
marriage. See DEAN, supra note 63, at 49.
235. KAHN, supra note 217, at 81.
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impulses and wanton indulgences, all without any consideration of factors
exceeding the self.
According to this account, homosexuality represented the triumph of
self-indulgence over self-government; of hedonism and anti-social values
over legal and social conventions; of self-interest over the greater good.
Several years later, this association of homosexuality with narcissism
would take on even more apparent urgency. Germany's National
Socialism and its influence abroad appeared to illustrate the grave dangers
inherent in the sort of egotism that forsakes difference. The analogy
between fascist ideology and homosexuality found expression in some
psychological accounts that emphasized the anti-democratic aspect of
homosexuality-the repudiation of difference, the inability to govern the
self, the triumph of passion over reason. 236
C. Homosexuality through the medico-legal gaze
Identity and its perplexing logic also commanded the medico-legal
perspective on homosexuality during this period. In his 1931 treatise
Medical Jurisprudence, Alfred Herzog classified homosexuality-the
identity-as a psychiatric problem, while referring to homosexuality-the
sexual practice-as a potentially legal one. Under the heading "Homo-
sexuality," he wrote:
Whether indulgence in a certain act of homo-sexual intercourse was
an irresistible or controllable impulse may be difficult to determine.
We should, however, say that every homo-sexual is mentally
abnormal by nature and should not be held responsible for his sexual
inclinations and an occasional indulgence therein, except he thereby
offends common decency or induces children to submit to his sexual
practices.237
With respect to legal regulation, psychiatrists and other medical
professionals approached the issue of homosexuality as they had those of
criminality and the psychopath. That is, they cast their own intervention
as essential to rectify or at the very least supplement a misguided and
ineffectual legal strategy. Where the law offered the universalizing
236. A provocative article titled "Homosexuality in Relation to the Problem of Human
Difference" argued that homosexuality reflected a weak, unbounded self, fearful of difference. "Basic
in the whole homosexual problem is the inadequate and insecure feeling about the self. There is the
fear of accepting and making creative use of difference because that would take one further along the
road of being a unique and separate person. This involves responsibility for self and relating that self
to others without loss of individual integrity." Frederick H. Allen, Homosexuality in Relation to the
Problem of Human Difference, 10 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 129 (1940). In his conclusion, the
author alluded suggestively to the phenomenon of Nazism, remarking that "[nlationalism in its
narrower and more intense manifestations might well be described as cultural homosexuality." Id. at
133. Wilhelm Reich contended that fascist ideology "draws its power from the suppression of genital
sexuality, which, on a secondary level, entails a regression along the line of passive and masochistic
homosexuality." WILHELM REICH, THE MASS PSYCHOLOGY OF FASCISM 163 (1933).
237. HERZOG, supra note 2, at 565-66.
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regime of "reasonable men" and a variety of acts those men might commit
with a variety of punishments attached, psychiatry developed an elaborate
classificatory system that eschewed universal norms in favor of a range of
diagnosable disorders and identities. On the other hand, where the law
fashioned a neat distinction between criminal offender and law-abiding
citizen, psychiatry understood the two to occupy a psychic continuum of
fantasies and unconscious identifications.
Some doctors simultaneously presumed that homosexuals as juridical
subjects were no more than the effect of legal and social regulation, and
posited the homosexual as a distinct category of person. The bridge
between these positions emerged from the observation that "[s]ociety's
attitude toward homosexuality encourages repression and this repression
results in many conflicts for the latent and overt homosexual." '238 In other
words, legal regulation itself gives rise to psychiatric conditions that then
require psychiatric intervention. But how to manage and contain the
apparently corrosive potential of homosexuality without the attendant
problems of legally contrived repression? It was in response to this
quandary that psychiatry seemed to offer an alternative to the old legal
regime. Yet, this avowedly more humane approach that shifted the
emphasis from criminal acts to psychologically intelligible identities
functioned to some extent insidiously, especially in its intersections with
the more rigid frameworks of law, to stabilize homosexual identity as the
cultural repository of concerns about unmanageable passions and the
limitations of self-government. 39
As a consequence of the confusion surrounding the status of
homosexuality-whether understood as a practice, or a variety of
person-the task of managing it seemed a formidable one at best.
Penalize acts and you risked missing its other influences or punishing
people who bore dubious responsibility, legally, for their conduct; target
the putative homosexuals and direct treatment toward them and you risked
overlooking a whole spectrum of persons and practices through which
homosexuality might proliferate. So it is not surprising that once doctors
began to conceptualize homosexuality in such terms, efforts to regulate it
took on more intensity and a variety of more intrusive forms, including the
sexual psychopath laws.2 40  In associating homosexuality with
238. Eugene W. Green & L.G. Johnson, Homosexuality, 4 J. CRAM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 467, 470
(1944).
239. See, for example, Julius Baur, Homosexuality as an Endocrinological, Psychological, and
Genetic Problem, 2 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 188 (1940), which argued that criminology must be
interested in the curability of homosexuality, since its role is to protect society against sex offenders
and since incarceration and the usual penal tactics have proven to be of no avail in altering
homosexuals' behavior. A 1947 issue of the British journal Medical Press devoted to "The Social
Problem of Homosexuality" contained a series of articles employing a medico-legal perspective,
including "Some Criminological Aspects of Homosexuality"; "The Medico-Legal Problem of
Homosexuality"; and "A Note on the Psychotherapeutic Treatment of Homosexuals in Prison."
240. As John D'Emilio described some years ago, "[a] view of homosexuality as disease spelled
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psychopathy, psychiatrists potentially exacerbated the prospects for those
who, committing an offense such as public solicitation or sodomy, might
trade a limited incarceration for an indefinite commitment. In the military
context, for instance, once the regulatory regime shifted from criminal
penalties for sodomy--often resulting in court martials and
imprisonment-to separation on the grounds of claimed or suspected
homosexuality, the number of servicemembers who fell under its purview
increased at least tenfold.241
By the post-war years the psychiatric perspective had so dominated the
scene that even where authors wished in part to dispel the image of the
homosexual as either a criminal or a sick person, they relied nonetheless
on characterizations of homosexuality that resonated so clearly with
discourses on psychopathy that their depathologizing gestures were
rendered virtually inaudible. Take, for example, the criminology textbook
that claimed: "The true homosexual is very much misunderstood by
laymen and police. The public assumes that he is a degenerate rather than
suffering from an affliction contracted through no fault of his own.
Though many homosexuals are fine and sensitive characters, they are
anathema to society in our culture, and we have no qualms about
persecuting them." '242  Despite their appreciation of homosexuals'
commendable qualities, these authors nonetheless recognized that, because
of their unfortunate "affliction," they were "anathema to society."
Moreover, in describing this affliction, the authors took recourse to the
familiar medico-legal rhetoric of irresistible impulse: "Certain
homosexuals, through biological factors such as inborn glandular
anomalies and defects, may be irresistibly impelled to behave as they
trouble even for those who never ran afoul of the law, since some families committed their gay
members to asylums." D'EMILIO, supra note 181, at 18. But he also identified as a salutary effect of
this medicalization the relative ease with which gay men and lesbians could embrace their newly
articulated identities in order to form subcultures and communities. See id. George Chauncy
describes the function of Repeal-era regulation to draw clear distinctions between the acceptable and
the unacceptable that significantly implicated homosexuals. For example, requirements that
establishments serving alcoholic beverages meet standards of "orderliness" in effect prohibited them
from legally serving gay men or lesbians (or prostitutes, gamblers, etc.), who were by definition
disorderly. Chauncy argues that the instability of gender roles following Prohibition and the
Depression motivated much of the anxiety around homosexuality and deviant sexual behavior, anxiety
that manifested itself in severe new regulations curtailing homosexual patronage and homosexual
representation in films and elsewhere. Consistent with the rhetoric of "indulgence" we observed, he
suggests provocatively that such anxious patrolling of boundaries bespoke a sense of homosexuality as
a dangerous temptation for all. See GEORGE W. CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, URBAN
CULTURE, AND THE MAKING OF THE GAY MALE WORLD, 1890-1940, at 337, 352-54 (1994).
241. As another significant consequence of the psychiatric turn in legal regulation of
homosexuality, lesbians became increasingly visible within a system that had largely ignored them
through its focus on particular criminalized acts. See, for example, Woman as a Sex Criminal (first
translated from the German and published in the United States in 1934), which drew a direct link
between lesbian desire and crime, particularly violent crime. ERICH WULFFEN, WOMAN AS A SEX
CRIMINAL 324 (David Berger trans., 1934) (1923).
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do. '2 43  As an alternative to punitive legal measures, they advocated a
system engaging psychiatric evaluation at an early stage of the
proceedings and probation conditioned on ongoing psychiatric treatment
for defendants charged with homosexual conduct. This by-now-familiar
"treat the criminal" approach both required and then perpetuated an
understanding of homosexuality as a pathological identity.
2 44
In sum, the psychiatric turn in the regulation of sexuality not only
engendered the sexual psychopath laws with their pseudo-medical
orientation and their disproportionate application to cases involving
(explicitly or not) homosexuality, but it also brought home the sense in
which homosexuals posed a threat to social stability, legal order, and
democratic values. The appearance in 1952 of the first Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-I) represented a kind of
apotheosis of the incoherent logic surrounding homosexuality. It listed
homosexuality among the sociopathic personality disturbances (beginning
the trend to replace the designation "psychopathic" with "sociopathic"),
asserting that persons so disturbed were "ill primarily in terms of society
and of conformity with the prevailing cultural milieu. 2 45 Homosexuality,
then, was psychiatrically speaking a type of sociopathy; yet because the
diagnosis defined itself in relational terms, it offers two contradictory
readings. Homosexuality as a sociopathic personality disturbance held no
intrinsic pathology, but rather constituted an illness merely in the sense
that it conflicted with current social and cultural values. Yet
homosexuality as a sociopathic personality disturbance derived its
pathology from precisely an inability to abide by current cultural values-
the difference may seem subtle, but it is essential. In the latter version, the
one that resonated more powerfully with the dominant discourse on
homosexuality at the time, homosexuality presents itself as deeply anti-
social and anti-legal force.
243. Id.
244. Even Alfred Kinsey, the first significant sex researcher in the United States, failed to escape
the logic of identity. Through his study of the sexual behavior of American men, Kinsey concluded to
great publicity that 37 percent of the male population had participated in at least one homosexual
encounter to orgasm between adolescence and old age. He wrote that, "[i]nstead of using these terms
[homosexual and heterosexual] as substantives which stand for persons, or even as adjectives to
describe persons, they may better be used to describe the nature of the overt sexual relations, or of the
stimuli to which an individual erotically responds." Alfred Kinsey et al., The Homosexual Outlet
(excerpted from SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE) in THE HOMOSEXUAL DIALECTIC 3, 7
(Joseph A. McCaffrey ed., 1972). See also PAUL ROBINSON, THE MODERNIZATION OF SEX:
HAVELOCK ELLIS, ALFRED KINSEY, WILLIAM MASTERS, AND VIRGINIA JOHNSON 67 (1989). But
nonetheless Kinsey occasionally used "homosexual" as a qualifier in a context where he clearly
imputed homosexual identities to his subjects-e.g., "homosexual individuals, homosexual males."
ALFRED KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 632 (1948). If the principal purveyor of an
anti-identitarian model of sexuality remained beholden, at least in part, to the powerful logic of sexual
identity, then it was clear that this logic had taken hold upon American culture.
245. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (Ist ed. 1952 ) (DSM-l).
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D. The jurisprudence of identity
Cases beginning in the 1930s displayed legal reasoning that has newly
embraced this medicalized logic for understanding and representing
deviant sexuality. Most relied on the minoritizing framework that
psychiatric medicine and sexology-as opposed to Freudian analysis-
introduced into cultural discourse. In 1936, the California Supreme Court
reviewed the murder conviction and death sentence of a defendant who
had admitted to killing a young woman whom he had met during his
wanderings. The court wrote: "The crime is gruesome, the circumstances
of its commission are unusual, and the motives which impelled its
commission are too recondite to be understood by the average person and
can only be accounted for by psychiatrists and criminologists, if at all." '246
Before the court even discussed the crime itself, however, it offered a
detailed life history of the defendant, a 28-year-old man, attending
particularly to his nomadic tendencies and his relationship to his parents,
who had separated in the early years of his life. The court seemed to give
special credence to the father's claim that the mother was "a woman of
doubtful morals" and "a lascivious person, irresponsible and
undependable." '247 Since his adolescence, the defendant had been a
restless and unstable sort who moved from city to city, job to job. About
this history the court wrote:
there is no doubt in the minds of the medical experts that his restless and
uncontrollable impulse to go from place to place was superinduced by a
desire to consort with those who, like himself, were homosexual....
Homosexuality, according to the medical experts, is an overmastering and
overpowering passion which may be subdued for a period of time but
often rekindles itself to such intensity as to cause or produce all of the
symptoms and disturbances which the evidence shows the defendant to
have exhibited.248
The defendant confessed to killing a woman who had resisted his sexual
advances; he choked her with her silk stocking and then, in the court's
words, "violated her person." '249 After a day of roaming around the city,
he arrived at the police station and announced his crime. Asked why he
thought choking her to death was "a good idea, he said 'revenge perhaps'
for 'all the misery I suffered.""'25
On appeal, the court considered whether or not to overturn the
defendant's conviction on the basis of his potential insanity. While the
court agreed with the jury that the defendant was legally sane at the time
246. People v. Walter, 60 P.2d 990, 991 (Cal. 1936).
247. Id. at 993.
248. Id. at 994.
249. Id. at 995.
250. Id. at 993.
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of the crime, it remarked that
[t]o the normal person, untrained in the science of psychosis, there
seems to be no explication of his life .... [It] may be that the urge of
resentment or for revenge, which is a symptom or trait of homosexuality,
and which he himself gave as the motive or impulse which actuated the
commission of the crime, was the overmastering passion which impelled
him to his deed. 5'
This "overmastering passion which impelled him to his deed," then, was
that same "overmastering and overpowering passion" that provoked his
nomadic behavior. Although this passion constituted an abnormal state of
mind, in the court's view it did not rise to the level of insanity, so the
death sentence stood. But how did the court reason from the murder of a
woman allegedly occasioned by her refusal of the defendant's sexual
advance to a theory of the case predicated on the overmastering passion
that characterized the defendant's homosexuality? Beneath the
defendant's claimed heterosexual passion, the court suggested, lay an even
more powerful passion: the passion of homosexuality, the passion of
resentment and revenge that leads ineluctably to crime. Thus
"overmastering passion" stands, in this opinion, both for some core
homosexual aspect of the defendant's identity and for the other antisocial
sentiments and acts to which this aspect apparently gives rise.
Even in sodomy cases, where commission of the acts themselves was
singularly at stake, character evidence brought in at trial recast the inquiry
as one about the defendant's identity. In People v. Hall, a 1939 New York
sodomy case, the court wrote: "This crime is unusual and unnatural. A
normal person would not commit this crime. Who would commit such a
crime? It certainly is essential to inquire into the mental attitudes and
physical reactions of a man charged with this crime in order to determine
whether he is such a man."252 Character evidence proving the defendant's
homosexual inclinations became the sine qua non of a conviction for
committing a criminal act.
The natural sex instinct is for the opposite sex. How then, are we
going to determine the sexual attitude of this defendant toward his
own sex? He is presumed in law to be a man with normal sexual
desires and not possessing an abnormal perversion. It was necessary
for the People to prove that the defendant was homo-sexually
inclined; that he had a passion toward his own sex that was unnatural.
If it be determined that the defendant was possessed of the passion,
emotion and desires referred to, then he is capable of committing the
crime of Sodomy and it follows that the jury could infer that he had a
251. Id. at 994.
252. 16 N.Y.S.2d 328, 329 (1939).
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sexual force which impelled him to do it.253
"Passion, emotion, and desires" determined the legal inquiry; the
presence of such features directed toward a member of his own sex would
effectively establish the defendant's deviation from the law's normative
subject-a man with "normal sexual desires."
Occasionally the elusiveness of homosexual identity kept the target of
regulation out of focus. In a case reinstating a liquor license to the
proprietor of a restaurant after his license was revoked on the premise that
he permitted homosexuals to congregate there, the court pointed to the
difficulty of verifying such a charge. "Homosexuals are often difficult to
identify, their proclivities may remain dormant for long periods of time,
and be disclosed only momentarily." '254 In particular, reasoned the court,
"[h]omosexuals are harder to identify than prostitutes, since they carry on
normally in other branches of life." '55 But, as Eskridge has pointed out,
the tentacles of identity-based regulation could reach where regulation
based on sexual acts might not.256 While reversing the convictions of
several defendants under a statute criminalizing the act of "loiter[ing]
about any toilet, station or station platform of a subway or elevated
railway or of a railroad... ," one court found that the statute was intended
to reach the conduct only of certain persons, from whose ranks the
defendants might be distinguished. "It is evident that the legislature by the
enactment of this statute sought to protect the decent citizens of the
community from contact with those sordid individuals who infest our
stations such as... the secretive and furtive homosexual or degenerate
whose motive is plain but whose acts may not constitute a violation of the
misdemeanor or felony statutes., 257
By the post-war years courts' increasing embrace of psychiatric
reasoning became apparent in cases involving homosexuality; indeed
many such cases provided a forum for judges to invoke and defer to
psychiatric insights. In 1949, a federal judge in Hawaii set aside the
verdict and granted a new trial after a jury convicted the defendant of first
degree murder, to which a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment
attached. Lamenting his own failure to inform the jury of the mandatory
sentence, the judge reasoned that the jury had given insufficient weight to
psychiatric testimony describing the defendant as a "latent homosexual"
who was compelled to extinguish manifestations of his repressed desire in
253. Id.
254. Lynch's Builders Restaurant v. O'Connell, 102 N.Y.S.2d 606, 610 (N.Y. App. Div. 1951).
255. Id. at 612.
256. Eskridge argues that with the rise of the modem administrative state in the 1930s and 1940s
came a three-pronged regulatory apparatus targeting homosexuality through a focus on acts,
unconventional gender identity, and desires or homosexual tendencies. See Eskridge, supra note 18, at
1069.
257. People v. Bell, 125 N.Y.S.2d 117, 119 (1953).
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the external world. Without naming a "homosexual panic" defense, the
defendant's psychiatric experts characterized homoerotic desire as a
compulsion that destroyed legal sanity. According to this testimony, the
defendant's brutal murder of an older friend, mentor, and "father figure"
occurred because, when this older man made sexual overtures toward the
defendant,
he was not actually conscious of killing a human, but was killing
some ever-present but unknown and obscure thing inherent in
himself, as one would kill a poisonous snake, and which he covertly
and unconsciously hated with an inspired, pent-up hatred that knew
no bounds, and was prompted and controlled at the time by his
rebellious subconscious mind; that at the moment of killing he was in
such an uncontrollable rage that he was no longer a rational person.258
Although the defendant's adolescent abuse by an older man contributed,
in this account, to the rage that overwhelmed his reason in this instance-
and the replication of this betrayal when a trusted friend and mentor
attempted to touch him sexually-it was his own homosexual self that he
wished to destroy in a kind of inverted narcissism. According to the
psychiatric testimony, this abuse may have "left a deep hurt and scar in his
inner consciousness which he kept secret and tried to forget, but
couldn't ....259
Notwithstanding his heterosexual marriage and vigilant defense against
homosexuality, "his inborn passiveness toward homosexuality made him a
mark, and he was something akin to a moth fluttering around a flame,
inviting danger but without any realization of the cause."26 For instance,
despite his seemingly happy relationship with his wife, "he had an
irresistible impulse to frequently go out to barrooms and drink with the
male habitues of such places, which were numerous ....,261 In granting
deference to the psychiatric testimony here, the court legitimated the
irresistible impulse model of criminal irresponsibility without appending
this designation to its decision. The defendant's "irresistible impulse" to
frequent bars thus becomes a metonym for his irresistible impulse to
murder. This opinion demonstrates the extent to which law not only
recognized psychiatric insights, but indeed appeared to have internalized
them.
This paradigmatic medico-legal assessment of homosexuality as a
condition of diminished will and reason found expression in numerous
cases from the post-war era. Psychiatric expert witnesses declared that
homosexuals suffered from compulsions that fell under the category of
258. United States v. Parelius, 83 F. Supp. 617, 621 (D. Haw. 1949).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 619.
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irresistible impulse, although they invariably escaped the purview of
M'Naghten. One doctor testified in a sodomy case "that the defendant
knew any deviation from the acceptable standard was wrong, but by
reason of this warping of his personality [his homosexuality] he was
unable to accept and be guided by that knowledge; that he cannot control,
by reason, his inability to choose between right and wrong, and that he is
mentally ill and.., should be looked upon as a weak person and not a
criminal . . . ."2 6 As the court pointed out in its opinion, "this species of
criminality" may not be amenable to traditional criminal law, although it
deferred on that question to the legislature.263
A 1956 Second Circuit immigration case dramatizes the tensions
psychiatric jurisprudence engendered in its pervasive incarnations
following World War II. Even more strikingly perhaps, this case
illustrates the kind of reasoning that understood homosexuality as a
condition in tension, and potentially irreconcilable with, that of being an
American citizen.264 In 1950, Cuban citizen Roberto Flores-Rodriguez
visited New York City, where he was arrested for loitering on a charge of
soliciting men in a public restroom "for the purpose of committing a crime
against nature. ' '265 When filling out a sworn application for an
immigration visa in Havana two years later, Flores-Rodriguez omitted
mention of his prior offense. Admitted to the United States as a
permanent resident, he again came afoul of the law against loitering and
disorderly conduct, receiving a perjury conviction in federal court when
his earlier omission emerged.2 66 On the question of his admissibility into
the United States as a citizen, the court of appeals deemed that omission
material, since the immigration statute at issue excluded persons who had
committed any crime or misdemeanor involving "moral turpitude.
267
Under the statute, both his conviction for such an offense and his perjured
statement suggested that he likely would be denied admission.
More important to the disposition of the case, however, his homosexual
identity, or what the court referred to as his "constitutional psychopathic
nature," would also strongly militate against him. Indeed, the statute
contained a subsection expressly excluding those who fell under the
designation "persons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority," among
other categories.268 When the opinion considered the government's claim
that Flores-Rodriguez fell under this subsection, it first noted that no
evidence had been adduced, "nor any data to inform our judicial notice, to
262. People v. Jones, 128 N.E. 739, 740 (I11. 955).
263. Id. at 741.
264. United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956).
265. Id. at 407.
266. Id. at 408.
267. Id. at 409.
268. 8 U.S.C.A. § 136(a) (West 1946).
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the effect that an homosexual who solicits unnatural acts in a public place
,,269comes within that category. By invoking psychological and
psychiatric theory, though, the court proceeded to make this diagnosis on
its own. Since under oath "defendant stated that he was indeed an
homosexual, that he had been practicing homosexuality all his life, and
had engaged in such acts in the United States. . . " the court expressed
confidence that "these facts might have led to defendant's certification as
a 'constitutional psychopathic inferior.' '2 1 In its analysis, the court relied
upon psychiatric glosses of this label, as well as the 1939 Minnesota case
construing the term "psychiatric personality" in the context of the state's
sexual psychopath law-the very construction that salvaged that law in the
Supreme Court. Following a synthesis of these interpretations, the opinion
continued: "We understand this little-understood and rarely interpreted
phrase-presumably out of the psychology books-to characterize
individuals who show a life-long and constitutional tendency not to
conform to group customs, and who habitually misbehave so flagrantly
that they are continually in trouble with authorities. 27 1 Surely, the court
suggested, in enacting this statute Congress would have wanted to
preclude from immigration any group of people "flagrantly" and
perpetually in violation of American customs; homosexuals were likely
such a group.
Moreover, reasoned the court, subsection (d) of the statute excluding
"mentally defective" persons equally prevented the defendant from
immigrating to the United States, since "this language was designed to
exclude homosexuals with exhibitionistic tendencies and other groups
with lewd proclivities similarly repugnant to the mores of our society." '272
To back this assertion, the court cited the American Medical Association's
Standard Nomenclature of Diseases and Operations [precursor to the
DSM-I] as an indication that "the medical profession regards
homosexuality as a mental disorder or defect .... "273 If the defendant
truthfully had revealed his conviction, the court continued, he surely
would have been subjected to a medical examination, which likely would
have found in him the kind of mental defect that would trigger subsection
(d).274 "Finally," insisted the court, "a sex deviate so afflicted with such a
defect of mentality ... is very likely to be brought into repeated conflict
with our social customs, constituted authority, and social environment. He
will find it extremely difficult to adapt himself, and to become a useful
269. 237 F.2d at 410.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 411.
272. Id.
273. Id. at411 n.7.
274. Id. at 412.
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member of the American community.- 275 Thus was homosexuality
manifestly incompatible with citizenship.
In a concurring opinion, one of the judges agreed that the defendant's
omission rendered him guilty of the perjury offense for which he was
convicted. But this judge sharply critiqued the court's foray into amateur
psychiatry, analogizing it to an unguided journey through unnavigable
waters. "I think it a mistake for my colleagues needlessly to embark-
without a pilot, rudder, compass or radar-on an amateur's voyage on the
fog-enshrouded sea of psychiatry." '2 76 In particular, the concurrence took
issue with the majority's seemingly facile application of the category
"constitutional psychopathic inferior" to the defendant. While this
category appeared in the statute's earlier incarnation, more recently in its
1952 revision Congress eliminated this antiquated designation for the
more updated "psychopathic personality." The relevance of this change,
the concurrence suggested, derived not from the later version's
applicability to the case under review (since the events at issue occurred
while the older version was still in effect), but from the majority's gloss on
the original category. That is, the majority's interpretation of this category
to include Flores-Rodriguez elided the essential qualifier "constitutional,"
meaning present at birth. No evidence existed before the court to suggest
that Flores-Rodriguez was a "constitutional" homosexual. With the
removal of this qualifier, the concurrence continued, Congress meant to
indicate that the congenital aspect was no longer relevant; but the need to
do so testified to its relevance under the original statute.277 Such a
misinterpretation on the majority's part, the opinion maintained, offered
evidence of judicial ineptitude with respect to psychiatric reasoning. "We
would smile (I trust indulgently) at psychiatrists who thought that most
legal terms possess clear, precise, stable meanings, easily to be learned by
thumbing a few judicial opinions and a legal dictionary. Why should we
hope to escape the smiles of psychiatrists if we behave similarly vis-a-vis
psychiatry? '
27 8
Notwithstanding this caveat, though, legal culture clearly had absorbed
psychiatric reasoning with respect to sexual psychopathy and its apparent
embodiment in the homosexual. Medico-legal reasoning constructed both
the psychopath and the homosexual as irresistible impulse incarnate: both
represented the dissolution of law's bounded subject, the failure to achieve
self-discipline. Whereas the ideal citizen exercised self-government
through command of her will and operation of her reason, the homosexual
in this view remained unable to govern his impulses. Through its
275. Id.
276. Id. (Frank, J., concurring).
277. Id. at 412-16.
278. Id. at 416.
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conflation with sexual psychopathy, homosexuality thus became
fundamentally inconsistent with ideals of democratic citizenship. Indeed,
by 1967 the deportation of homosexuals for their status alone seemed
quite uncontroversial. In Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,279 the United States Supreme Court concluded matter-of-factly
that, in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, "Congress used the
phrase 'psychopathic personality' not in the clinical sense, but to
effectuate its purpose to exclude from entry all homosexuals and other sex
perverts., 28" The utility of this psychiatric classification now rested
entirely on its regulatory force to produce and police sexually deviant
identities.
E. An unholy alliance
If members of the psychiatric community had been guided by a certain
opportunism in seizing upon the category of the sexual psychopath as a
means to expand their authority within the legal system, then they found
eminently willing collaborators in legislators and jurists alike. Members
of the legal community were largely content to cede authority to their
psychiatric colleagues if doing so itself entailed a subtle expansion of the
legal purview. Whereas the offense-based regime permitted legal
regulation only of particular conduct, psychiatric jurisprudence and
legislation invoking psychiatric expertise facilitated legal intervention at
the level of status, a dubious prospect at best. The admixture of psychiatry
and law here produced a tenuous result that offended the ideals of both
cultures: a medico-legal category with little psychiatric validity and still
less legal defensibility. This category, born of the evolving norms of the
psychiatric discipline, was then reified by legislative and judicial decree.
Legal proceedings adjudicating this category skirted the procedural checks
of the criminal law while nonetheless deploying the appellation
"criminal," and offered up a nominally medical remedy that amounted to
an indefinite confinement.
Some mid-century commentators began to see the sexual psychopath
laws as the progeny of an unholy alliance between law and psychiatry.
For instance, a 1949 editorial in the American Journal of Psychiatry posed
a question that, though strikingly elementary, had been almost entirely
absent from prior discussions of the issue within the psychiatric
community: "Why do we want jurisdiction in these cases transferred from
the courts to the psychiatrists? 281 The answer, reverberating throughout
the psychiatric and psychological literature of the preceding decade, was
279. 387 U.S. 118(1967).
280. United States v. Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 122 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)).
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of course the inadequacy of penal remedies and the manifest superiority of
long-term, individualized treatment. As this editorialist acknowledged,
however, the movement toward treatment rather than criminal sanctions
for the sexual psychopath remained hollow as long as medicine lacked the
means to heal this ailment. Since, he pointed out, few psychiatrists will be
willing to vouch for a sexual psychopath's recovery in those states where
the period of confinement is left to the discretion of doctors to pronounce
a cure, "[t]he net result is an indefinite and purely custodial confinement,
behind bars, for a patient to whom the average state hospital has nothing to
offer in terms of definitive treatment. '282 He thus called the efficacy of
sexual psychopath laws into question for their failure to make good on the
reason for which they supplanted traditional legal remedies: the need to
replace incarceration with medical treatment and analysis. The editorialist
suggested that psychiatrists themselves were partly to blame for this
precipitous shift in jurisdiction: "We have lectured and written so much
and so positively about the dynamics of sexual aberration that the public
has finally taken us at our word, and in many states they have turned the
sex psychopath over to us to deal with., 283  He concluded with unusual
circumspection about the role of psychiatry in legal matters, at least those
involving sexual offenders. "Perhaps it is time to confess," he wrote, "this
is an area in which we may have been overselling psychiatry."284
When New Jersey commissioned a report on the "habitual sex offender"
in 1950, its editor, sociologist Paul Tappan, agreed with this assessment of
sexual psychopath legislation, calling it "ineffective" and stressing its
"futility. ' 285 Among the fallacies he attempted to expose in this report,
Tappan wrote disparagingly of one maintaining that "'sex psychopathy' or
sex deviation is a clinical entity. '286  Far from representing a coherent
psychiatric category, he argued, the notion of sexual psychopathy was in
fact entirely fraught and disputed within the psychiatric community.287 In
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. The sociologist Edwin Sutherland took an even stronger position on the overselling of
psychiatry:
Certain psychiatrists have stated that they are interested in the sexual psychopath laws
principally as a precedent; they believe that all or practically all criminals are psychopathic, that
all should be treated as patients, and that psychiatrists should have a monopoly on professional
advice to the courts. These laws are dangerous precisely from this point of view; they could be
passed over in silence otherwise, as a product of hysteria. The question is whether psychiatrists
have a monopoly of knowledge of human personality and human behavior which warrants their
nomination as 'the experts' in the field of diagnosis and treatment of criminals.
Sutherland, supra note 18, at 554.
285. See PAUL W. TAPPAN, THE HABITUAL SEX OFFENDER: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE COMMISSION ON THE HABITUAL SEX OFFENDER 13-16 (1950).
286. Id. at 15.
287. Tappan wrote: "Two-thirds of the psychiatric authorities consulted by the writer pointed to
the wide disagreement among psychiatrists as to the meaning of the term, sex psychopath. More than
half of them maintained that this condition is not a sufficiently clear diagnostic entity to justify
legislation concerning the type." Id.
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addition to this critique, Tappan leveled other damning charges against the
sexual psychopath laws, claiming as did the American Journal of
Psychiatry editorialist that they failed miserably to deliver on the promised
treatment288 and to reach the very "dangerous and aggressive offenders"
toward whom public fears were directed. Indeed, he admonished, "[m]ost
of the persons adjudicated are minor deviates, rarely if ever 'sex
fiends.' 289 Given these failings, and yet given that these laws nonetheless
provided for indefinite confinement, they constituted a grave threat to
individual rights. Despite the civil nature of the proceedings and their
structural analogy to the civil adjudication of insanity, Tappan asserted,
these proceedings and the confinement in which they resulted violated due
process and other basic liberties. Thus indicting legal reasoning for its
hubris in purporting to absorb psychiatric knowledge without any sense of
its nuances, and for its reliance upon formalism-both what he dubs "a
technical legalism of the most vicious sort"290 and the more general faith
in law as a solution-Tappan took up where the editorialist left off,
impugning law where the other had impugned psychiatry.29'
CONCLUSION
In part because of such critiques, sexual psychopath laws fell into
general desuetude in the late 1960s and beyond. At the same time,
jurisprudence returned to a more suspicious stance with respect to
psychiatric and psychoanalytic insights. In the past decade and a half, new
legislation directed toward "sexually violent predators" has resurrected
psychiatric commitment as a means of incapacitating certain sex
offenders-merely one among the new technologies for "managing the
monstrous" 292-but without nearly the verve for interdisciplinary
collaboration that characterized this earlier era. That era, though,
illustrates some of the ways in which legal culture may occlude those
288. "Methods of effective treatment have not yet been worked out. The states that have passed
special laws on the sex deviate do not attempt treatment! The 'patients' are kept in bare custodial
confinement." Id. at 15.
289. Id. at 16.
290. Id.
291. The final, and perhaps most spurious, fallacy in Tappan's list is the conviction "[t]hat the sex
problem can be solved merely by passing a new law on it." Id. Perhaps the most contemptuous among
his critical evaluations was the following: "Some 'authorities', confused in their oestrus to resolve at
once problems of sex control that have beset man throughout the span of human history recommend in
one overheated breath the greatest possible severity of punishment for all sex deviates and in their next
impetuous exhalation declare that the problem is medical and must be turned over at once and in its
entirety to psychiatrists." Id. at 13-14. His California counterparts Bowman and Engle synthesized
these critiques in their contribution to the Langley Porter Neuropsychiatric Institute's published
California Sex Deviation Research (1952). They took up the issues of prevention, treatment, and
diagnostic utility, evaluating the recent legislation negatively on each count and describing a general
consensus that "psychiatry has been oversold .... Bowman & Engle, supra note 189, at 106.
292. See generally Jonathan Simon, Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the New
Penology, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 452 (1998).
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insights that appear to challenge law's integrity, such as the fraught nature
of free will and the significance of unconscious motivations. At the same
time, law eagerly assimilates those insights that shore up its apparent
inviolability.
Yet, as the evolution of medico-legal reasoning demonstrates, the
separation of these insights relies on a fundamental incoherence. In one of
his lectures at the College de France, Michel Foucault describes the
function of expert psychiatric opinion on the character and mental life of a
criminal suspect to construct "a juridically indiscernible personality over
whom, in the terms of its own laws and texts, justice has no
jurisdiction." '293 The psychopath became just such a figure - a subject
whose essential pathology was precisely his ungovernability and hence his
insusceptibility to legal regulation. Medical science purported to offer its
expertise and its humane concern for the individual to supplement an
antiquated, punitive, and ultimately ineffective legal regime: "The sordid
business of punishing is thus converted into the fine profession of
curing., 294 But the incoherencies that plagued medico-legal reasoning
around psychopathy and sexuality rendered the subject of this conversion
impossibly indistinct.
293. MICHEL FOUCAULT, ABNORMAL: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE 1974-1975, at 21
(Valerio Marchetti & Antonella Salomoni eds., 2003).
294. Id. at 23.
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